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How does money laundering affect civil wars? In the thesis, the author argues that there are 
considerable synergies between the two. Within money laundering, there are precise indicators 
but little data on the true scale of money laundering because of the sensitivity of the data. Within 
political violence, there is data on conflict intensity but few precise indicators that explain 
variation. By considering how civil war organizations use money laundering, this thesis 
demonstrates that money laundering indicators are more consistent predictors of political 
violence than those traditionally used in political violence studies. This thesis surveys civil war 
violence in Myanmar, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand, and Indonesia from 1997 to 2019. 
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1. Introduction and motivation 
1.1 Why should conflict scholars care about money laundering?  
The United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC) estimates that approximately 2-5% of 
the world’s GDP, or $800 billion to $2.5 trillion, is laundered annuallyi. If this statistic is not 
shocking enough, the annual amount of money laundered is equivalent to somewhere between 
the gross domestic product (GDP) of Switzerland and the United Kingdom. For armed 
organizations, this underground economy is an opportunity to not only raise and hide funds 
from the state but to also purchase weapons and other equipment necessary from criminals to 
launch future attacks. For perspective, the Institute for Economics and Peace estimates that 
while the September 11 attack cost approximately $400,000-500,000; the 2007 London, UK, 
car bombs that killed fifty-six only cost $10,000. Failed attacks such as the 2006 Cologne, 
Germany, commuter attack only cost $500ii. Insurgent tactics are likely to cost substantially 
more with less variation because of the need to maintain entire armies.  
 
Organizations engaged in civil wars have used a blend of insurgent and terrorist tactics. Large 
transnational organizations have similar revenue streams to mid-sized multinational companies 
with Ernst & Young estimating that the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) earned 
approximately $970-1,890 million in revenue in 2014 though estimated revenue decreased to 
$520-870 million in 2016iii. These funds are thought to be scattered and deposited in various 
regional hawala or informal value transfer systems.  
 
Despite this formidable public policy and security challenge, there is a dearth of literature that 
explicitly ties money laundering to conflict intensity. This thesis has three main aims: (A) To test 
the correlation between money laundering and conflict intensity; (B) To investigate whether 
organizations operating in varying anti-money laundering/counter (the) financing of terrorism 
(AML/CFT) environments have different levels of reliance on money laundering; (C) To 
determine if an organization’s reliance on money laundering is a good predictor of its preference 





1.1 Thematic context: Contemporary money laundering and bank secrecy concerns  
Automation and other financial trends aimed at streamlining deposit and investing processes 
pose additional security risks. For example, in 2017, the New York State Department of 
Financial Services (DFS) and the Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project (OCCRP) 
found Deutsche Bank’s Moscow office to be allegedly complicit in using mirror trading to aid 
Russian actors launder more than $10 billion to offshore locationsiv. Mirror trading is a trading 
strategy that allows traders to automatically ‘mirror’ the trades executed in the trader’s 
brokerage account. In this particular context, the Russian equities desk would allegedly sell a 
quantity of blue-chip stock while an offshore company would call the same equities desk and sell 
an equivalent amount of the same stock bought by the Russian company that is ultimately 
owned by the person or entity buying the blue-chip stock. In reality, however, there is nothing 
inherently illegal about this alleged arrangement and designating it as ‘money laundering’ is 
arguably a stretch. From a security perspective, however, this evasion of capital and money 
laundering controls is risky considering that the beneficial owners of these offshore companies 
could potentially be nefarious actors. The Deutsche Bank Moscow incident indicates that 
organizations may not simply exploit activities that can be clearly designated as money 
laundering and emphasizes the need to evaluate countries’ macro-level vulnerability. 
 
For years, authorities and activists globally have attempted to stem the flow of money 
laundering. Besides authorities like DFS, activists like the International Consortium of 
Investigative Journalists (ICIJ), have systematically exposed institutions and individuals 
responsible for the continued abuse of the world’s financial system. Notably, in 2020, the ICIJ 
released the third leak of the US Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) filesv, 
revealing that multinational banks transferred more than $2 trillion worth of funds to 
suspicious clients between 1999 and 2017.  
 
Money laundering, however, is an umbrella term. Theoretically, it is attractive to a whole host of 
actors from criminal gangs to armed organizations looking to fund violence. While the source of 
funds ‘washed’ for criminals are illegal, they are not necessarily so for armed organizations. As 
evidenced by the infamous Khun Sa of the Shan State Army in Myanmarvi, it is possible for an 
armed organization to run legitimate businesses such as construction and to plausibly use the 
profits derived to fund violence. While these businesses are legitimate, this sort of funding still 





more accurately should be labeled as AFT). Hence, as a general rule, money laundering occurs 
when the money concerned is illegal either in its origins or its intended purposes.  
 
With a plethora of actors and methods involved, money laundering is a moving policy target. 
Adding to this difficulty, controlling money laundering is often at odds with the government’s 
other objective of attracting investment. It is an open secret that jurisdictions such as Singapore, 
Switzerland, the Netherlands, and the Cayman Islands are tax havens. The term ‘tax haven’, 
however, is a misnomer since the term encapsulates many regulatory aspects from low taxes to 
financial secrecy to allowing behavior that effectively aids individuals dodge taxes through base 
erosion and profit shifting (BEPS) tactics. BEPS tactics, such as the infamous Double Irish 
arrangement, exploit gaps and mismatches in tax rules and are commonly used by the likes of 
Apple, Google, and Microsoft.  
 
The flip side of their tax haven reputation is their heightened vulnerability to money laundering. 
For instance, the ICIJ reported that Singapore received approximately two-thirds more 
incoming money laundering ($2.9 billion vs $1.8 billion) than the United States from 1999 and 
2017 despite its economy being less than 2% of the United States’vii. It must be noted, however, 
that the ICIJ predominantly published FinCEN transactions linked to major US banks throwing 
the representativeness of the data into question.  
 
Paradoxically, jurisdictions known for their tax haven status have been at the forefront of the 
development of AML/CFT standards. The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, for 
example, is arguably the most recognized global banking watchdog, covering everything from 
AML/CFT standards to risk management. However, tax havens, bank secrecy, and money 
laundering are by no means exclusive policy challenges for wealthy jurisdictions. In particular, 
popular culture’s focus on tax policies obscures the fact that these onshore tax havens often have 
relatively decent AML/CFT regimes. This helps separate ‘harmless’ legal tax reduction strategies 
that predominantly aid wealthy individuals and corporations from financing related to criminal 
networks. Admittedly, the effectiveness of this filter is questionable in light of events like the 
aforementioned 2017 Deutsche Bank Moscow incident.  
 
According to the 2019 Basel AML Indexviii, Singapore scored 4.98 on a scale from 1 to 10 with 10 
being the worst; Switzerland, 4.96; Netherlands 4.86; the Cayman Islands was not rated. In 





five lowest-rated countries are Mozambique at 8.22; Laos at 8.21; Myanmar at 7.83; Afghanistan 
at 7.76; Liberia at 7.35. While these jurisdictions may not be as attractive to wealthy entities 
looking to dodge taxes, they are potentially more attractive to illicit organizations looking to 
maximize their ‘hiddenness’ from authorities. Adding to these jurisdictions’ vulnerability, 
countries with weak AML/CFT regimes often suffer from pre-existing political conflict. With the 
exception of Laos, the countries listed above were all experiencing at least one civil war in 2021. 
Despite this, there has been little literature that investigates how weak AML/CFT regimes in 
countries with high instability exacerbate conflict.  
 
While fields such as law and criminology offer rich literature on the history and development of 
AML/CFT standards and policies, AML/CFT literature remains largely absent from political 
science. Related valuable literature within political science have focused on terrorist financing 
and exogenous asset price changes. Terrorist financing literature analyzes organization-level 
dynamics through either estimating the potential financial resources organizations have or 
through developing game-theoretic models of how organizations choose between launching 
terror attacks and other activities. Much literature also aims to disentangle political violent 
networks from criminal ones. Asset price literature deploys macroeconomic principles to 
investigate how variations in the exogenous price of capital-intensive and labor-intensive assets 
affect civil wars. Hence, while terrorist financing literature is limited because of the level of 
analysis, asset price literature is limited because it indirectly measures the amount of funds 
organizations potentially have through investigating labor market effects. Moreover, this 
literature tends to focus on a few assets that are often not representative of an organization’s 
total revenue stream. Hence, this thesis hopes to meld approaches in criminology and conflict 
economics to quantitatively merge AML/CFT discussions with conflict intensity.  
 
This thesis offers a novel model that explains and predicts future conflict intensity based on 
financial and economic indicators. To caveat, this model is intended for states that have some 
pre-existing level of civil war. For example, it would be inappropriate to apply this model to 
Singapore which has not had a civil war in its history. Furthermore, because of the limitations of 
this thesis, the model’s accuracy in explaining and predicting conflict outside of Southeast Asia 
is unknown.  
 
I specifically investigate Myanmar, Thailand, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Indonesia. I exclude 





Similarly, while Cambodia experienced notable political instability in the aftermath of the 
Cambodian Civil War in 1975, political violence levels have plummeted since the 1990s. 
Moreover, political violence in Laos has been largely restricted to violence exacted by the 
government on civilians. Cases of political violence in Vietnam have similarly been 
comparatively low in the past twenty years. For emphasis, I do not argue that political violence 
and AML/CFT weaknesses are not a threat in Singapore, Brunei, Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam. 
Rather, I posit that these countries are less salient for exploring the relationship between money 
laundering and conflict since conflict simply barely exists.  
 
Lastly, I train a random forest model for predicting conflict intensity in the region. I argue that 
increasingly popular machine learning approaches are unsuited for money laundering and 
conflict data. 
1.2 Institutional context: Money laundering concerns in Southeast Asia  
Southeast Asia is an economically diverse and dynamic region. Across the countries of interest, 
the average year-on-year GDP growth rate averages around five percent except for Thailand 
where GDP growth hovers around three percentix. Despite this, more than fifty percent of 
Southeast Asian residents are unbanked and rely on informal value transfer systems for their 
financial needs. Informal value transfer systems are networks that help individuals transfer 
money while avoiding mandatory reporting legislation and at times, unfavorable exchange rates 
and taxes. These systems pose substantial AML/CFT risks because of the lack of robust 
reporting and record-keeping mechanisms. Despite relatively high growth rates, AML/CFT 
institutions remain shaky. As mentioned, Myanmar has one of the weakest AML/CFT systems 
globally at 7.86, Thailand was rated 6.01, Philippines, 5.67, Malaysia 5.25, and Indonesia 4.62 
by the Basel AML Index in 2019x.  
 
Without the requisite institutional resilience, economic growth serves as a threat multiplier 
since a growing amount of capital flows through weak regulatory gatekeepers. While many have 
praised the so-called digital payment revolution in Southeast Asia, this FinTech-led 
financialization leads to unique challenges. Financialization broadly refers to the increasing 
importance of the financial sector to the economy. In this context, it refers to the increasing 
number of individuals who maintain bank accounts. According to the World Bank, from 2014 to 





from 36% to 49% in Indonesia, 81% to 85% in Malaysia, 23% to 26% in Myanmar, 31% to 34% in 
the Philippines, 73% to 82% in Thailand. 
 
FinTech allows financial service providers to reach more individuals more quickly. In rural 
areas, the cost of installing bank outlets and automated teller machines may be unappealing to 
financial institutions. E-payment systems being digital allow providers to avoid such costs. 
Being non-face-to-face, these systems are prone to exploitation. Financialization is, of course, 
not necessarily a negative thing. Countries with low financialization like Myanmar would 
logically rely on cash and informal value transfer systems, structures that have even fewer 
AML/CFT controls. Adding to the complexity, some of the Southeast Asian countries surveyed 
have sizable remittance inflows because of the number of overseas workers. In 2019, in contrast 
to a world average of 0.762%, the World Bank estimated remittances as a percentage of GDP at 
3.18% in Myanmar, 0.45% in Malaysia, 9.33% in the Philippines, 1.50% in Thailand, and 1.04% 
in Indonesiaxii.  
 
 
Figure 1: remittance as a percentage of GDP in Southeast Asia 
 
While most remittance system users are genuine, the remittance system is also systematically 





to remit money through different currencies and different intermediaries before returning to the 
originators. By ensuring that each remittance is just below the mandatory legal reporting 
threshold, actors can exploit the remittance system.  
1.3 Scope of study  
For the purposes of this thesis, I define political violence as organized violence committed for a 
political purpose. I define political purpose as aiming to change or protest the de facto or de jure 
state of affairs. Because of my focus on pre-existing conflict, I only focus on political violence 
that occurs within the context of a civil war. This importantly does not preclude cases of one-
sided violence against civilians and merely delineates that organizations must have a stated 
political goal of changing the de facto or de jure government. In effect, I analyze cases where 
organizations attack governments and vice versa and where organizations attack civilians. I 
exclude cases where governments attack civilians since AML/CFT policies appear less relevant 
in explaining government-led one-sided attacks. I focus on 1997 to 2019 firstly because data on 
political violence pre-1997 is spotty and because the majority of AML/CFT measures were only 
implemented after 9/11 in Southeast Asia, although global AML/CFT discussions can be traced 
back to the earlier 1980s US War on Drugs.  
 
As such, the scope of this paper is limited to civil wars in Myanmar, Thailand, the Philippines, 
Malaysia, and Indonesia from 1997 to 2019. Political violence has a rich literature and the 
debate surrounding disentangling ‘insurgency’, ‘terrorism’, and ‘crime’ is an important one. In 
this thesis, I treat these terms as tactics within the broader context of a civil war which I, in turn, 
treat as a state of affairs. 
 
For the purposes of this thesis, the distinction between insurgency and terrorism is salient 
insofar as it illuminates the different costs of political violence. The relationship is not as simple 
as it seems. Intuitively, one would expect insurgent tactics to cost substantially more than 
terrorist tactics. However, the cost of maintaining armies for organizations already engaged in a 
civil war is likely to be a fixed cost. I.e., an organization would not be able to not pay its soldiers 
simply because no attacks were launched in a certain month. The ‘tuning knob’ in this 
mechanism is the variable cost of the different equipment needs and other expenses such as 
bribery, reconnaissance, etc. Moreover, armies are trained in military settings, and switching 
over to terrorist tactics is not necessarily easy given the need to get acclimatized to the urban 





how money laundering relates to these variable expenditures and hence, how organizations 
choose between insurgency and terrorism. 
 
The limitations of the data hamstring a full quantitative treatment of these theories and require 
the author to spend considerable space estimating organizations’ potential revenue gains by 
proxies. To estimate the size of the money laundering economy, I attempt to quantify macro 
indicators that attract and deter potential money launderers. I predominantly use the 
international standards set by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) that evaluates regimes 
based on policy coordination, confiscation powers, potential sanctions, and preventive 
measures. I use FATF instead of BIS because FATF offers distinct evaluations for each 
jurisdiction. I also analyze bank secrecy separately to investigate how bank secrecy and 
AML/CFT policies interact within countries. By quantifying these push-and-pull factors, I 
indirectly approximate how attractive the gains from money laundering are to organizations.  
 
Lastly, I investigate whether these security risks associated with money laundering occur as a 
threat multiplier or in competition with the possible misappropriation risks associated with licit 
and illicit assets. As mentioned, resource models investigate how exogenous changes in the price 
of assets affect levels of violence. By comparing and interacting such models with this money 
laundering model, I discern whether organizations are likely to attempt to store proceeds from 
misappropriation in the banking system, or whether the decision to accrue proceeds using 
physical assets or through the banking system presents a resource allocation problem to 
organizations. In this thesis, I analyze steel, natural gas, crude oil, coal, and narcotics data. I 
only apply narcotics data to Myanmar. While narcotics production and trafficking are a problem 
across Southeast Asia, I focus on Myanmar because of the explicit links between Myanmese 
organizations and the narcotics trade. I evaluate all models at both the country- and 
organization-level.  
2. Literature review  
The challenge of merging literature from AML/CFT and political violence is a daunting one 
since little connection has been hitherto established. The corpora are also massive in and of 
themselves. To structure this review, I focus on three guiding questions: (A) What are the major 
AML/CFT institutions and relevant models? (B) What are the substantive differences between 





strategies? (C) What are the economic differences between insurgency and terrorism, and 
associated counterinsurgency and counterterrorism strategies?  
2.1 AML/CFT institutions and relevant models 
In Money-laundering in Southeast Asia: liberalism and governmentality at workxiii, Wong 
contends that FATF is not just the major AML/CFT organization globally, in that it actively 
assesses the strength of organizations globally. But also, because the standards outlined by 
FATF are uptaken regionally through diffusion. In effect, like most international organizations, 
FATF ‘governs’ by expert opinion without having the necessary sovereign power to enforce 
standards. As such, adherence to AML/CFT standards is measured through “mutual 
evaluations” and through ‘naming and shaming’ particularly egregious offenders. Wong notes 
the existence of FATF-style Regional Bodies (FSRBs), such as the Asia/Pacific Group on Money 
Laundering (APG), is evidence that global compliance is enforced not simply through ‘naming 
and shaming’, but also by furnishing compliant regimes with approval because “governments 
dread the signs of backwardness and therefore eagerly adopt policy innovations”. Wong 
contends that FATF standards are hence not mere window dressing because of both carrot and 
stick mechanisms. For example, both the Philippines and Indonesia amended their AML/CFT 
after being placed on the FATF blacklist, the Non-Cooperative Countries and Territories 
(NCCT), from which they were only removed in 2005.  
 
Substantively, Wong notes, as I have done, that Southeast Asia is a hub for money laundering 
through criminal profits laundered through “casinos, huge investment flows, remittance and the 
business linkages between local diasporic communities in the ‘west’”. In addition to the APG, the 
ASEAN +3 (APT) requires member organizations to provide economic and financial information 
to analyze important indicators, though the focus on indicators like short-term capital flows 
indicates that APT is more primed towards monitoring macroeconomic stability than enforcing 
AML/CFT standards. Additionally, Wong notes that some countries have Financial Intelligence 
Units (FIUs) as recommended by the Egmont Group, an international organization that 
facilitates cooperation and intelligence sharing, that serves as a center for suspicious activity 
reporting (SAR) and other information sharing on money laundering and predicate offenses. 
FIUs are also crucial for interoperability by coordinating the efforts of different government 
agencies. Lastly, Wong contends that corruption, lack of transparency, the informal economy, 
and the dominance of cash in the short-term further hamstrings enforcement and limits the 






Walker and Unger quantitatively arguexiv that among other factors, bank secrecy, corruption, 
and technical AML/CFT capabilities, can directly predict the amount of trade-based money 
laundering globally. Trade-based money laundering specifically targets the import and export of 
goods and abuses trade finance products.  
 
Walker and Unger were motivated by expanding the “case-oriented” nature of AML/CFT 
scholarship at the time and aimed to create a methodology that could predict country-level 
money laundering. Walker and Unger first problematized the assumption that more robust 
AML/CFT regulations necessarily lead to less money laundering. In particular, they cite Kugler, 
Verdier, and Zenouxv, and conceptualized that criminal organizations operating in oligopolistic 
conditions are likely to compete by corrupting public officials and acquiring market power in 
illegal markets. In these market conditions, oligopolistic criminal organizations detract from the 
Becker hypothesisxvi that deterrence works to deter crime.  
 
Furthermore, Walker and Unger problematize the traditional linear conception that increased 
policing necessarily leads to less crime. Instead, in response to harsher punishment, organized 
crime can “feudalize” the state--paradoxically, Walker and Unger note that stricter punishments 
can lead to increased organized crime and more corruption. In an effort to conceptualize a more 
nuanced model, Walker first proposed the “Walker Model” in 1995 that was supposedly deemed 
as the “leading model for measuring international global money laundering”.   
 
The Walker model is theoretically underpinned by Newton’s Law of Gravitation and the 
Tinbergen model which states that the amount of bilateral trade is dependent on the economic 
‘mass’ of two countries and the distance between them. Walker and Unger also highlight that the 
theoretical framework has synergies with the Heckscher-Ohlin model that predicts international 
trade from factor endowments. The Walker model, in turn, predicts that the amount of money 
laundering is a factor of GNP, bank secrecy, government attitude towards money laundering, 
SWIFT membership, conflict, corruption, and distance between countries. Despite offering 
evidence for the model’s empirical validity, later studies such as Ferwerda et alxvii of which 
Unger was a co-submitter suggest that the original Walker model equation’s functional form 
needs to modified to include multiplicative variables in specific subsets of money laundering 





Ferwerda et alxviii find that other variables such as common language, religion, and colonial 
background also affect money laundering. 
 
2.2 Substantive differences between crime, terrorism and insurgency 
Relating the literature on anti-money laundering back to political violence, Ruggiero expounds 
on the crime-terror nexusxix and argues that the actor and not the crime differentiates organized 
violence from political violence.  Importantly, Ruggiero first differentiates organized crime from 
crime in general by the scale and time span of activities, and the fact that the incarceration of a 
few members of organized crime does not stop the activities of the group. Furthermore, 
organized crime members are “professional” because of their “full-time involvement in 
illegality” and acquisition of the requisite skills for “career advancement”. Crucially, Ruggiero 
notes that this notion of professionalization is at seeming odds with the perception that criminal 
markets are flexible ones.  
 
Ruggiero notes that seminal thinkers such as Cesare Beccaria and Jeremy Bentham defined 
political violence from the lens of social contract theory--i.e. That political violence occurs as a 
non-state response to “excessive state violence”. While organized criminal groups “imply the 
alliance between highly heterogeneous groups and individuals”, “terrorist networks...require a 
substantial degree of homogeneity among participants”. This collective identity and “imagined 
finalism” differentiate the two. Furthermore, while organized crime uses violence as one of 
many tools to secure and navigate markets, political groups use violence to signal their 
opposition to systems. Citing Makarenkoxx, Grabosky, and Stohlxxi, Ruggiero argues that the 
activities of both groups have become increasingly similar, especially when they do business 
transactions together such as “exchanging drugs for weapons”. The division between the two is 
porous because of the possible “politicization of ordinary criminals who eventually join terrorist 
groups” and “individuals turning from fighters into criminals” in exchange for some benefit.  
 
In The illicit drug trade, counternarcotics strategies and terrorismxxii, Piazza finds that drug 
production, and opiate and cocaine wholesale prices, are significant positive predictors of 
terrorism while crop eradication and drug interdiction are significant negative predictors. In 
theory, narcotics financing is crucial for helping organizations acquire more funds to fund future 
attacks. This study was among the first to empirically argue that conventional counternarcotics 





Norton and Chaddertonxxiii survey relevant counterterrorism international law such as the 1963 
Terrorism Financing Convention, UNSCR 1267 (1999), 1373 (2001), and 2178 (2014) which 
mandate states to take measures to actively prevent terrorist activities.  
 
Counterrorism policies are, of course, not the same as counterinsurgency policies though 
overlaps certainly exist. In Do counterterrorism (CT) and counterinsurgency (COIN) go 
togetherxxiv? Boyle argues that in the context of low-intensity civil wars, like the so-called ‘War 
on Terror’ in Afghanistan, counterterrorism and counterinsurgency can work in opposition to 
one another. Crucially, COIN model focuses on direct (coercion) and indirect (‘hearts and 
minds’) tactics of increasingly separating insurgents from the population. In contrast, CT 
models focus on “sporadic but ruthless use of force against terrorist operatives to degrade their 
capabilities”. Hence, while COIN uses coercion “sparingly” and focuses more on “using violence 
to shape the preference of the local population”, CT is “kinetic” and faster-paced. Furthermore, 
citing Kilcullen’s concept of the ‘accidental guerilla’, terrorist organizations do not necessarily 
have deep roots in communities and can even be “parasitic”. Organizations targeted using COIN 
have strong roots with the population. Lastly, CT approaches do not traditionally involve state-
building or political components whereas COIN ones do.  
2.3 Economic differences between terrorism and insurgency  
Despite these differences in military strategies, there is a paucity of literature that directly 
compares the economic dimension of counterterrorism and counterinsurgency policies. Many 
civil war scholars, however, have incorporated economics by analyzing the effects of asset prices. 
In the seminal paper Commodity Price Shocks and Civil Conflict: Evidence from Colombiaxxv, 
Dube and Vargas show that price shocks to labor-intensive industries disproportionately reduce 
labor hours. The “opportunity cost effect” causes violence to increase as income shocks decrease 
the opportunity cost of joining armed groups. On the other hand, increases in the price of 
capital-intensive goods intensify conflict in the regions producing that good due to a “rapacity 
effect” because of rent-seeking behavior. Since then, other studies have had contradictory 
results. In Do Commodity Price Shocks Cause Armed Conflict? A Meta-Analysis of Natural 
Experimentsxxvi, Blair, Christensen, and Rudkin conduct a meta-analysis of three-hundred-and-
fifty quantitative studies that link price shocks with conflict. They find that on average, 
commodity prices do not affect conflict. However, there is evidence, contra Dube and Vargas, 
“that price increases in labor-intensive (capital-intensive) commodities prevent (provoke) 





2.4 Preliminary observations  
In the literature review, I explored two main buckets of analyses. The first attempts to measure 
money laundering but doesn’t relate it to conflict or political violence. The second attempts to 
meld economics and political violence by analyzing the effects of asset production on civil war 
and terrorist violence. As mentioned, while there is no shortage of literature that compares the 
military differences between COIN and CT methods, there is a paucity of literature that 
distinguishes their economic differences. While civil war literature distinguishes between labor- 
and capital-intensive assets, CT literature on narcotics operates on the null hypothesis that the 
more potential revenue organizations receive, the more terrorism occurs. Furthermore, there 
has been a paucity of effort to tie the general literature on COIN and CT to AML/CFT regimes.  
 
3. Theory  
3.1 Overview: Political violence and finance  
As mentioned, there are two main approaches of relating finance to political violence. The first 
structural bucket draws more heavily from approaches in criminology and macroeconomics. The 
second price-driven bucket draws more heavily from approaches in microeconomics. While the 
first constructs models for estimating and measuring illicit financial flows (IFFs) from and to 
states and regions, the second uses tests how market-level exogenous changes of resources and 
goods, such as narcotics, affect organizations’ use of terrorism and other forms of political 
violence.  
 
Though the first bucket is very useful for predicting which states are more vulnerable to money 
laundering, it was not designed to filter out acts of ‘pure’ criminal purposes. I.e., it remains 
untested whether the factors outlined in the Walker model are relevant to actors engaged in civil 
wars. On the other hand, while the second bucket has superior explanatory power in tying 
financing to political violence, it does not explain or predict overall political violence well 
because it focuses on a few assets that are not representative of organizations’ entire revenue 
streams. Furthermore, while academically interesting, it is arguably difficult to derive suitable 







By integrating these two approaches using a novel theory of financial source formality, this 
thesis provides a new model that can be deployed to predict conflict intensity and craft country- 
and organization-specific COIN and CT policies.  
3.2 Concepts and mechanisms in the literature  
3.2.1 The Political in political violence: a recursive paradigm  
The first course of action is the toughest: defining political violence. For this thesis, I define 
political violence as the use of violence to achieve a political goal. There are two main types of 
political violence: insurgency and terrorism. Adjacently, there is considerable debate on how 
crime intersects with political violence. I define terrorism as the political, deliberate, and 
indiscriminate use of violence on civilians; crime as an act that maximizes the perpetrator’s the 
financial or personal gains of the; insurgency as a political uprising aimed at challenging or 
overthrowing the state. Comparing the three, crime is distinguishable from insurgency and 
terrorism because of the lack of a political motive. However, this distinction is hard to 
operationalize given that ‘political’ is in most part defined axiomatically or simply equated with 
civilian targeting, rendering its inclusion analytically moot.  
 
‘Political’ is also sometimes used in opposition to ‘economic’. A common illustration is that 
though bank robberies target civilians, they are not traditionally classified as terrorism because 
robbers do not have political motives--in the sense that they do not wish to overthrow the 
government or pressure the government to make a policy change. Another easily 
operationalizable distinction is that while criminals hide their identities from the public and the 
wielders of legitimate political power like the police, political actors tend to use violence to 
attract the attention of the broader community.  
 
This illustration is somewhat contrived for two reasons. Firstly, many new threats like 
cybercrimes increasingly complicate this political and economic distinction. There is 
considerable debate on whether crimes such as hacktivism and the targeted use of distributed 
denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks on crucial government and public infrastructure should be 
classified as cyberterrorism. Secondly, organizations frequently labeled as terrorist groups such 
as ISIS have engaged in criminal behavior such as theft and extortion to fund their activities. 





organizations are commonly designated as politically violent groups, these specific acts fall 
under the umbrella of criminality. 
 
Furthermore, all organizations, regardless of their aims, require finances to operate. As such, 
armed organizations engaged in civil war may also commit violence akin to petty crimes for 
political reasons such as to accrue funds for a bombing. Thus, while the act of violence is either 
political or economic in its objective, the goal of the organization cannot be clearly bifurcated. 
This highlights the importance of differentiating act-based and organization-based definitions of 
political violence. While act-based definitions focus on the details of the attack, organization-
based definitions abstract from an organization’s perceived intended purpose. However, since 
goals can only be derived from reviewing manifestos and other organizational documents, even 
act-based treatments enter into a recursive loop when such definitions boil down to a notion of 
the ‘political’.  
 
The distinction between terrorism and insurgency, on the other hand, is an easier one: terrorist 
tactics target civilians while insurgent tactics target government and military targets. Because of 
the spottiness of real data, the difference between insurgent and terrorist tactics can best be 
conceptualized as a spectrum based on civilian deaths as a percentage of total deaths. Civilian 
targeting is hence a ‘tuning knob’ proxy that approximates whether an organization is likely to 
be engaging in insurgent or terrorist tactics.  
 
 Political goals? Civilian targeting? 
Terrorism  Y Y 
Crime  N Y 
Insurgency  Y N 
Figure 2: An act-based overview of violent tactics  
 
3.2.2 Illicit financial flows  
According to Global Financial Integrity (GFI), a non-profit organization, illicit financial flows 
(IFFs) are illegal movements of money or capital from one country to anotherxxvii. In contrast, 





activity or more explicitly: money that is illegally earned, transferred, or used, that crosses 
borders. The World Bank further divides IFFsxxviii:  A) Illegal financial acts (corruption, tax 
evasion, etc.) B) Funds from illegal activity (narcotics, smuggling, etc.) C) Funds directed 
towards illegal activity (terrorist financing, nuclear financing, etc.). The Organisation for 
Corporation and Economic Developmentxxix (OECD) further specifies that IFFs are cross-border 
financial transfers that contravene national or international laws.  
 
Like political violence, I argue that the categories stipulated by the World Bank are not mutually 
exclusive. I list possible combinations below. Note that the two axes are identical and that the 
examples exemplify ‘pure’ forms of IFFs if the associated axis labels are identical. 
 









goods imported to 
evade duties and 
taxes  
A logging company 
deliberately 
obscuring the illegal 
origins of its timber 
for a profit  
A human trafficker 
carrying a briefcase of 
cash across a border 
without declaration 
to fund more 
trafficking operations 
Funds from illegal 
activity  
NIL  An organization 
generating revenue 
from kidnappings 
An organization using 
trade-based money 
laundering 
techniques such as 
mixing legal money 
from the sale of legal 
timber with illegal 




NIL  NIL  An individual wiring 






to engage in 
terrorism 
 
Figure 3: Examples of IFFs  
 
 
Figure 4: Visual representation of different concepts in financial flows literature (not to scale) 
 
An example that satisfies all three categories: a corrupt official allowing a known organization 
that uses terrorism to establish a shell company to launder money from human trafficking to 
fund terrorism in the future.  
 
As such, the three categories roughly fall into the following dimensions: source (funds from 
illegal activity), process (illegal act), and endpoint (funds directed towards illegal activity). For 
this thesis’s purposes, it makes seeming sense to focus on the endpoint of money laundering. 
After all, while under-declaring imports is a crime, it does not necessarily imply that the culprit 
organization will use the profits to fund political violence. Moreover, while human trafficking is 
morally heinous, for example, it is not the exclusive domain of politically violent actors as many 
petty gangs and criminals also accrue revenue from such a source. 
 
Given the difficulty of retrieving any kind of data on IFFs, however, these distinctions are 
extremely difficult to make in practice. Nevertheless, it is possible to directly estimate trade-





method for moving money illicitly across borders that involves the deliberate falsification of the 
value, volume, and/or type of commodity in an international commercial transaction of goods or 
service by at least one party to the transaction. International organizations like the UN and the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) compile data on bilateral trade interactions. For every 
country, these organizations record declared import and export values with all trade partners. 
By looking at the differential between what Country X declared it imported from Country Y and 
what Country Y declared it exported to Country X, we can estimate the value lost due to trade 
misinvoicing. However, it is crucial to note that trade misinvoicing is but one type of illegal 
financial act.  
3.2.3 Basic Walker model  
The Walker model is an approach in criminology that estimates IFFs. The Walker model was 
conceptualized in 1995 as a method to approximate trade-based IFFs. That is, to estimate the 
percentage of outgoing money laundering flowing from Country X to Country Y. Walker loosely 
based his model on Walter Isard’s 1954 gravity model of tradexxx which was in turn formulated 
from Isaac Newton’s law of gravitation and touted as one of the most empirically validated 
models in macroeconomics. The logic of a gravity model is as follows: the attractive force (for 
money laundering in this case) is proportional to the ‘mass’ of the object and the inverse squared 
mutual distance. The ‘mass’ in this instance refers to factors that render a country more 
susceptible to money laundering. Thus, Isard’s and Walker’s models’ respective simplified 
intuition is simple: States that have structural factors such as high GDP per capita or bank 
secrecy laws are more attractive to trade with or to launder money through, and are hence more 
likely to have more trade or money laundering. 
 
Similarly, consider two countries, X and Y. The flow of funds from Country X to Country Y is 
dependent on both the ‘attractiveness’ conditions in country A and country B. These conditions 
are GNP per capita, corruption, conflict level, SWIFT membership, bank secrecy laws, and 
government attitude towards money laundering. To measure inflow from X to Y, one takes the 
Walker score of Y divided by the distance between the two countries, and vice versa.    
 
I make three major modifications to repurpose the model as a proxy for money laundering in the 
broader context of civil wars. 1) While Walker calls for a weighted composite score, I consider all 
components unweighted for a finer-tuned analysis 2) I exclude SWIFT membership and conflict 





trade-based money laundering, I repurpose the model to measure both domestic and cross-
border financial flows by re-formulating and inventing novel methodologies for measuring the 
aforementioned factors (See “Theoretical Contributions”). 
 
As such, the original Walker model is stipulated as:  
 
Attractiveness=GDP per capita.(3BS+GA+SWIFT-3Conflict-Corruption + 15) 
 
Where BS=bank secrecy, GA=government attitude to money laundering, SWIFT=swift 
membership, Conflict=level of conflict, Corruption=level of corruption 
 
 
I modify the equation as follows:  
 
 
Attractiveness=GNI per capita.[3BS+average (GAtechnical, GAtreaties)+ Egmont-Corruption +3] 
 
Where BS=bank secrecy, GA=government attitude to money laundering, Egmont=Egmont 
membership, Corruption=level of corruption 
 
4. The puzzle: Relating illicit financial flows to civil wars  
 
The puzzle relates these two incredibly rich and complicated fields by focusing on two simple 
interrelated questions: (A) How do illicit financial flows affect the wealth of organizations 
engaged in civil wars? (B) Is an organization’s wealth correlated with its choice of violent tactic 
(insurgency vs terrorism)?  I also theorize that civil war organizations engage in a two-staged 
model: (1) Revenue-generating: the use of crimes to accrue funds (2) Execution: the use of 
insurgency or terrorism to achieve pre-conceived aims. This follows the act-based definitions 





5. Theoretical contributions  
Chapter five contends with two unresolved topics from the previous sections. Firstly, what is the 
Political in political violence? As explored in 3.2.1, definitions of political violence often devolve 
to tautology. I argue that the notion of a political goal can be disaggregated to smaller 
discretionary measures. Secondly, how do civil war organizations’ criminal and politically 
violent behavior cogently align with their overall strategy? Unlike pure criminals that rarely seek 
the public’s attention or leave the criminal realm, civil war organizations toggle between 
criminal and political behavior, switching between tactics that fly under the government’s radar 
and instances of political violence that seek the public’s and government’s attention. Regardless 
of their goals, as rational actors, organizations aim to maximize the amount of funding 
(profitability) that they have and minimize the risks of exposing their financial sources to 
authorities (security).  
 
5.1 Contribution 1: Criminality and political violence as a two-staged business model  
Instead of treating criminality and political violence as a binary, I argue that both modes of 
violence form a plausible two-staged business model for civil war organizations. During the first 
revenue generation stage, organizations use criminal methods to accrue funds. During the 
execution stage, organizations either fund insurgent or terrorist tactics (or choose to not attack). 
Civil war organizations hence exist in both the criminal and the political violence paradigms.  
At first blush, this appears like an ill-conceived business model. During the first stage, 
organizations attempt to stay as hidden as possible to prevent authorities from discovering their 
criminal financial sources. During the second, however, organizations aim for the opposite by 
deploying violence to cow governments and civilians into submission. This inherent 
contradiction is worsened by the anticipated government reactions. The more aggressive an 
organization becomes in the execution stage, the more likely a government is to retaliate with 
draconian measures which, in turn, risks the discovery of the organization’s financial sources.  
 
Furthermore, as the civil war progresses, organizations need an increasing amount of money to 
expand its armies and to purchase more weapons. To square this seeming contradiction, I 





suggests that where an organization ultimately stands on this tradeoff is largely a factor of its 
leadership including the leaders’ risk-bearing profile and vision for the organization. To 
encapsulate these discretionary concerns, I introduce a novel measure: the marginal propensity 
to attack.  
5.2 Contribution 2: Theory of financial source formality  
I define financial source formality as the degree to which an organization’s finances are 
entwined with the banking system. This necessitates some form of a due diligence and know-
your-customer (KYC) process hence excluding informal money lenders and other institutions 
that do not require or store formal documentation.  
 
Formal financial sources do not simply include money in checking and savings accounts. 
Organizations are unlikely to have one massive bank account. Rather, they are likely to have a 
multitude of accounts in various currencies and jurisdictions to hedge the risk of being detected 
by AML/CFT regimes. Formal financial sources also include capital in the broader banking and 
financial systems, such as trade finance products, brokerage accounts, and shell companies. 
Informal financial sources are not necessarily cash-based. Rather, they are cash agnostic. 
Informal financial sources mediate and misappropriate finances through the sale of tangible 
assets like steel or crude oil. By bifurcating financial sources in this manner, we can also 
indirectly measure how much proceeds from informal sources get ‘reinvested’ into the formal 
banking system.  
 
From a purely financial perspective, formal financial sources are more likely to be more 
profitable to organizations for three reasons. Firstly, formal sources are potentially 
multiplicative. By potentially participating in mirror trading or investing in legitimate 
businesses, organizations can increase their pool of funds. Secondly, formal sources are 
multinational and multi-currency. By having a series of accounts, organizations can receive and 
send donations and funds from and to operatives and sympathizers globally. Thirdly, formal 
sources are multi-purpose. By serving as a collection point for potential proceeds from a 
multitude of sources, formal sources allow organizations to execute their strategies more 
efficiently.  
 
Informal financial sources are possibly more important than formal ones for nascent 





organization does not have deep pockets at the get-go. Furthermore, though beyond the scope of 
this paper, it is possible that informal assets present diversification benefits for organizations 
with a high absolute amount of money in formal sources. Informal sources are not necessarily 
easier to set up, however. Unlike formal sources, informal sources require willing buyers and are 
highly sensitive to market and exchange-rate perturbations. Unfortunately, the limitations of 
this thesis also hamstring an investigation of this intuition.  
 
Thus far, the theory of financial source formality relates how the type of financial sources 
possibly affects the amount of financing an organization has. To connect the theory with 
political violence, I introduce a novel mechanism of terrorism as variable cost in 5.4 that 
considers how the quantity of finances affects an organization’s preference for insurgency or 
terrorism. In sum, I argue that comparing two civil war organizations, the organization with a 
higher proportion of formal financial sources would have a lower risk of passing the threshold 
where it would not be able to pay its troops. Because of this, terrorism would most likely be an 
inferior good for this organization and the organization would have a preference for insurgency.  
 
Linking both political violence and the theory of financial formality, I also introduce a terrorism-
insurgency mechanism in 5.5 that links formal financial sources to a preference for insurgency 
via the income effect.  
 
5.3 Mechanism 1: The plowback-spend-execute tradeoff  
An organization’s marginal propensity to attack (MPA) is a discretionary measure that 
quantifies an organization’s ‘inner’ workings. Discretionary mechanisms differ from systematic 
ones because they rely less on logical deduction and more on subjective decision-making 
processes. Discretionary is deductive while systematic is inductive.  
 












MPA links the two stages of the business model. It also hints at how politically motivated an 
organization is. An organization firmly devoted to its cause will likely have a higher MPA than 
one that is more concerned with securing its revenue. If income decreases, a more politically-
motivated organization is less likely to decrease its attacks. MPA hence also accounts for the 
possibility that organizations may suffer from mission creep and begin focusing on the first 
stage of the business model.  
 
The MPA measure is particularly useful because the first-order derivative negates other 
contextual differences and allows for convenient cross-country comparisons. Furthermore, 
instead of reducing discussions of organizational goals to a tautological notion of the ‘Political’, 
MPA provides an empirical measure of an organization’s strategic decision-making. I term this 
as ‘strength of conviction’.  
 
MPA also encapsulates long-term thinking. Like a firm, organizations face the strategic 
question: Is it more profitable to ‘produce’ more political violence now, or to plowback ‘profits’ 
to develop deeper financial sources that can potentially increase the wherewithal to launch 
future attacks? It is also possible for an organization’s leadership to simply be more risk-averse.  
 
Dimension  Question  
Strength of 
conviction 
Is the organization predominantly using proceeds to launch attacks or for 
other purposes like purchasing luxury goods?  
Long-term 
thinking 
Is the organization plowing back profits to expand its financial sources or 
using finances to launch attacks now?  
Risk-aversion  Does the organization foresee considerable resistance to attacks now? 
Figure 5: Dimensions that affect MPA 
 
It may be empirically possible to create three separate measures though the construction of 
which is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
5.4 Mechanism 2: Terrorism as variable cost in civil wars 
This mechanism is a systematic one that illustrates that an additional unit of terrorism would 
cost more for a politically-motivated non-civil war organization than a civil war one. Scholars 
have debated whether terrorism outside and within the context of a civil war are substantively 





while othersxxxii argue that terrorism serves a distinct purpose in civil wars. In this context, I 
argue that terrorism in these two contexts is financially different. As mentioned in the 
Introduction, while the cost difference between insurgent and terrorist tactics appears different, 
this seeming differential ignores the higher fixed costs civil war organizations have.  
 
Conceptualizing organizations as firms, organizations can be thought of as existing in an 
industry with a demand curve most closely resembling traditional Marshallian demand. I 
assume that the political violence ‘industry’ is a distinct market because the goods produced 
(i.e., terrorism and insurgency) are unique. The Marshallian demand model is particularly 
salient for comparisons across two classes of firms (civil war and non-civil war) as it does not 
assume that utility or income stays constant. 
 
In this model, price refers to the cost of using terrorism and marginal revenue quantifies the 
perceived political gain from committing terrorism. Comparing an organization engaged in a 
civil war to one that is not, the latter will have a higher fixed cost curve than the former. Ceteris 
paribus, for low levels of production (i.e., low number of attacks), the marginal cost for each 
additional attack is higher for non-civil war organizations. Thus, notwithstanding the 
aforementioned contextual difference in the strategic objectives of using terrorism in a civil war 
and a non-civil war context, these economic differences suggest that terrorism is less costly for 
civil war organizations--though the differential in cost converges as attacks increase.  
 
5.5 Mechanism 3: The insurgency-terrorism tradeoff  
This mechanism is a systematic one that applies more microeconomic principles to illustrate 
that a civil war organization prefers insurgency to terrorism in optimal conditions. By definition, 
organizations engaged in civil war aim to achieve some form of change in the de jure or de facto 
government. This can include objectives from ethnic separatism to ideologically-driven 
(particularly communism) movements. To achieve this, terrorism can be conceptualized as an 
indirect means, relying on public spectacle and Hobbesian panic terrorxxxiii to cow citizens into 
pressuring governments to accede to the organization’s demands. 
 
In contrast, insurgent tactics directly denigrate the government’s capabilities and gradually 
degrade public support for the civil war. Hence, all else being equal, insurgent tactics are more 





Secondly, as mentioned, civil war organizations require armies that have a fixed cost. In 
comparison to an insurgent tactic that requires a large number of troops, terrorism often 
requires significantly less manpower, rendering a significant portion of troops ‘unused’. As such, 
in the short-run, a rational organization would maximize gains by optimizing its use of troops. It 
is possible that organizations would be able to vary the size of their troops in the long-run but 
the permutations of this possibility are beyond the scope of this thesis.  
 
Analyzing organizations solely engaged in civil wars, I deploy the Slutsky identity because it 
encapsulates both the income effect (as explored in the Marshallian model above) and the 










Where i,j are terrorism and insurgency respectively and m represents income.  
The income effect is represented by the second derivative on the RHS and the substitution effect 
by the first derivative.  
Or in terms of elasticities,  
𝜖𝑖𝑗 = 𝜎𝑖𝑗 − 𝛼𝑗𝜂𝑖 
Where aij is the compensated price elasticity of terrorism with respect to the price of 
insurgency, aj is the budget share of insurgency, and ni is the income elasticity of terrorism.  
 
In the short-run, fixed costs are not variable. In other words, an organization is unlikely to be 
able to drastically modify the size of its troops. I assume that at constant income and utility 
levels, an organization will have a strong preference for insurgency in the short-run. As such, I 
argue that only organizations that are under substantial financial pressure would take drastic 
measures including not paying or even dismissing troops, despite the negative ramifications on 
the broader community’s support of the organization and its cause. During this process of 
contraction, an organization would lose a sizable portion of its strength and size. Such a process 
is very hard to reverse in the short-run because those let go would not readily ‘trust’ that the 
organization will be able to employ them in the future. As such, I consider the two classes of 






For an organization that has not undergone this contraction, I assume that terrorism is an 
inferior good. When the price of terrorism increases, the increase in income will lead to a 
decrease in the demand for terrorism increases (income effect). However, the substitution effect 
increases because of a decrease in the rate of substitution between terrorism and insurgency 
meaning that organizations sacrifice fewer units of insurgency for an additional unit of 
terrorism. Hence, theoretically, the overall demand for terrorism is unknown and dependent on 
the individual magnitudes of the substitution and income effect. While there is insufficient space 
to fully model this behavior, I argue that the income effect is likely to outweigh the substitution 
effect for these organizations because the substitutability of insurgency and terrorism is likely to 
be small, regardless of the financial circumstances of the organization in question.  
 
For an organization that has undergone this contraction, I assume that terrorism is a normal 
good. When the price of terrorism increases, the increase in income will lead to an increase in 
the demand for terrorism (income effect). Similarly, the substitution effect increases. Hence, the 
overall demand for terrorism increases. For organizations that undergo this unexpected 
contraction, terrorism may actually be superior to insurgency because of the ‘marketing’ effect of 
demonstrative violence that may garner more donations and sympathizers. This marketing 
effect is less valuable to organizations with sound finances because of its inefficiency. Terrorism 
is also very risky. On the one hand, terrorism may push citizens to pressure governments to give 
in to demands. However, on the other, terrorism may also induce governments to use 
exceptionally harsh measures in an effort to maintain legitimacy. To the extent that 
organizations are rational, only those in dire financial straits will favor terrorism over 
insurgency. As a point of clarification, the financial threshold that divides terrorism as an 
inferior and normal good is an organization-specific rather than an industry standard.  
 
5.4 Mechanism 4: To attack or not to attack? Case of Northeast Myanmar 
The central problem for rationalist explanations of conflict is as follows: what factors hamstring 
the formation of an ex ante agreement given that ex post cost of conflict? Given the asymmetric 
nature of civil wars, the seeming equilibrium tends to conflict unless the state has considerable 





The latter is best exemplified by the case of narcotic production and trafficking in Northeast 
Myanmar.  
 
For Myanmar, I specifically investigate poppy-derived drugs such as opium and heroin, and ya 
ba. Ya ba pills are a mix of methamphetamines (shabu) and caffeine. The meth trade in Asia is 
estimated to be worth around US$60 billion, the majority of which originate in the many 
contested areas in the country. Though Myanmese EAOs still rely on opium as a source of 
revenue, most have dramatically shifted to ya ba smuggling given its profitability and the fact 
that meth labs are less visible than fields of poppies to the government. Unlike licit goods like 
coal and steel, civil war organizations likely have higher market power in the narcotics industry. 
While the exact number of market participants is unknown, armed organizations do not 
compete with traditional corporations for control of the narcotics market. 
 
Complicating the context, the Tatmadaw (Myanmese military) is allegedly complicit in narcotics 
production by accepting ‘taxes’ for permission to produce narcotics. Unlike other forms of 
corruption, alleged complicity in drug production and trafficking is systematic. Furthermore, 
this reported complicity indicates that the organizations indicate that organizations may not 
have strong goal resolution and are more invested in the first-stage of the aforementioned 
business model.  
 
Hence, insofar as government complicity occurs and the organization in question prefers to 
accrue profits than attack, the context in Northeast Myanmar exemplifies a classic bargaining 
problem: Why do attacks still occur when both organizations and the Tatmadaw are financially 
better off when complicity occurs? Let 𝜋 represent the financial profits from narcotics, D the 
organization that produces and traffics narcotics, G the governments. The possible agreements 
are:  
 
𝑋 = {(𝑋𝐷 , 𝑋𝐺): 0 ≤ 𝑋𝐷 < 𝜋 and 𝑋𝐺 = 𝜋 − 𝑋𝐴}   
 














N accepts offer B if 𝐵 ≤
𝛿𝐷(1−𝛿𝐺)
1−𝛿𝐷𝛿𝐺





Payoffs (𝑋𝐷 ∗, 𝑋𝐺 ∗) is a Rubinstein bargaining solution if it solves the constrained optimization 
problem: 
𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑎𝑥𝛿𝐷,𝛿𝐺(𝛿𝐷 − 𝑑𝑁)(𝛿𝐺 − 𝑑𝐺) 
Subject to: 
(𝛿𝐷 , 𝛿𝐺)  ∈  𝑈 
(𝛿𝐷 , 𝛿𝐺)  ≥ (𝑑𝐷 , 𝑑𝐺)  
 
Where d represents the disagreement point. As 𝛿 tends to 1 and the ‘friction’ (1- 𝛿  ) within the 
system disappears, we reach a system that resembles the Nash equilibrium and the payoffs tend 
to ½. The incentive for reaching an agreement is higher for organizations with more mercenary 
interests since the total financial proceeds,𝜋, decreases with each round of Rubinstein 
bargaining. Assuming low friction,  
 
In this case, (𝑑𝐷 , 𝑑𝐺)  =  (𝜋(1 − 𝑣), 0), 𝑣 ∈ (0, 1] 
 
Where v is the disagreement payoff which in this case represents the financial cost of an attack. 
The Nash bargaining solution can be expressed: 
𝑈 𝐷
𝑁 = 𝜋(1 −
𝑣
2






As such, as v increases, the utility of the organization (D) decreases and the utility of the 
government (G) increases. This suggests that cooperation is less appealing the stronger the 
government and/or the weaker its strength. This counterintuitively suggests that weaker 
organizations are associated with higher conflict intensity.  
 
There is insufficient space to fully operationalize the MPA and complicit bargaining mechanism. 
For the purposes of this thesis, I use these mechanisms like the terrorism-insurgency 
mechanism--as heuristic tools to interpret the empirics. I also predominantly consider these 
mechanisms for Myanmar in Hypothesis 5 because of qualitative information about the size and 






6.1 Operationalization  
Measuring political violence  
Due to the limitations of this thesis and the paucity of data, I only approximate the category an 
event belongs in, i.e., insurgency or terrorism by the composition of fatalities. For example, if 
ninety percent of an event’s associated fatalities are civilians, I surmise that the event is more 
likely to be a terrorist one. It may be possible to use natural language processing to derive the 
location of the event from the source article in future work. I define an event as a discrete 
incident where either the organization or the state launched an attack. While casualties do not 
necessarily follow, events have a clear start and an end where a cessation of violence occurs.  
 
Measuring illicit financial flows  
As with most macroeconomic data, Goodhart’s Law hinders the task of measuring illicit 
financial flows. In a 1975 article the United Kingdom, Problems of Monetary Management: the 
U.K. Experiencexxxiv, economist Charles Goodhart posited that “As soon as the government 
attempts to regulate any particular set of financial assets, these become unreliable as indicators 
of economic trends.” In 1997, anthropologist Marilyn Strathernxxxv generalized Goodhart’s Law 
with the axiom that “When a measure becomes a target, it ceases to be a good measure”. In 
effect, Goodhart’s Law has been compared to Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle in quantum 
mechanics in the sense that both exemplify a precision-comprehensive tradeoff. Furthermore, 
Goodhart’s Law, as a macro-level Hawthorne effect, suggests that macroeconomic indicators are 
no longer good representations of macroeconomic phenomena when they become important in 
policy discussions because governments simply optimize for indicators that observers track (we 
can also make a loose comparison to the observer effect).  
 
The two main instruments I deploy for measuring illicit financial flows are no exception. To 
recapitulate, these two instruments are a modified Walker model and trade misinvoicing.  
For the most part, these two instruments are arguably not very popular measures. However, 
these two instruments exemplify the opposite poles of the precision-comprehensive tradeoff. 
The disaggregated Walker model accounts for a range of regulatory condition indicators, 
accounting for both domestic and cross-border illicit financial flows. While comprehensive, 





laundering. On the other hand, while trade-based money laundering has high precision they 
cover but one aspect of money laundering.   
 
Neither instrument can totally separate illicit financial flows relevant to civil war organizations 
from the reservoir of flows relevant to petty criminals. Furthermore, while the FinCEN data 
traces how major multinational banks have been complicit in money laundering, the cases 
pulled are reported to not be representative of the universe of money laundering. This class of 
data, however, is very useful for pointing out specific geographies and banks that have been 
particularly egregious.  
 
 
Operationalizing the Walker model  
The disaggregated approach offers two main advantages. Firstly, it allows us to tease out which 
indicators are most relevant to civil war organizations. Secondly, it allows us to investigate 
country and year trends, unlike the standard Walker model that assumes that the same 
indicators have equal weight across space and time. To recapitulate, I exclude conflict to prevent 
endogeneity. I exclude SWIFT membership since most countries in question have adopted 
SWIFT in the late 1990s and early 2000s rendering its value questionable. I include Egmont 
membership as the organization started in 1995 but the countries in question (if at all) only took 
up membership in the 2000s hence inducing considerable variation. I separate government 
attitude into technical standards and international cooperation to investigate if the two have 
differing impacts on the financing of insurgency and terrorism. I add a constant of 3 to 
theoretically prevent negative Walker scores. As such, I effectively investigate GNI, bank 
secrecy, AML/CFT technical capabilities, international cooperation, Egmont membership, and 
corruption.  
 
To clarify, while GDP measures the total market value of all finished goods and services 
produced within a country, GNI is the total income received from its residents and businesses 
regardless of location. Given that the thesis is concerned with incoming financial flows, GNI is a 
more suitable measure as it takes all organizations and individuals who use international 





6.2 Linking conflict intensity with financial sources  
To link financial source formality to the terrorism-insurgency mechanism, I focus on civil war 
events. This does not preclude non-state violence on civilians, but merely specifies that the time 
these events are included in the data is linked to the ‘start’ of a civil war. In effect, this allows me 
to analyze how groups toggle between attacking the state, other non-state actors, and civilians in 
the context of some form of a civil war Hence, cases are included so long as 1) The context of a 
civil war holds; 2) One side of the dyadic relationship is a non-state organization.  
 
I operationalize terrorism and insurgency as measures of conflict intensity by analyzing the 
variation in the number of cumulative deaths and civilian deaths as a percentage of cumulative 
deaths. The latter allows me to evaluate each organization’s preference for insurgency and 
terrorism. I use civilian targeting as the main distinguisher between insurgency and terrorism. 
Because of data quality issues, I treat the distinction between insurgency and terrorism as a 
spectrum rather than a binary. Hence, by analyzing the percentage of civilian deaths, I 
approximate organizations’ preferences for insurgency and terrorism on a sliding scale. 
 
My theory is (A) Organizations that rely more on formal sources are more likely to inflict more 
deaths overall and are more likely to target hard targets. (B) Organizations that rely on more 
informal financial sources are more likely to target civilians rather than hard government targets 
(terrorism).  
 
Admittedly, the relationship between financial source formality and conflict may be 
endogenous. In this thesis, however, I only advance the argument that a correlation between 
formal sources and insurgency exists rather than arguing for any degree of sequential causality.  
 
To measure formal sources, I consider the counterfactual: What barriers do organizations face 
in establishing formal financial networks? The more conducive an environment is to illicit 
financial activity, the more funding civil war organizations raise, and the worse the potential 
conflict intensity. Following the terrorism-insurgency mechanism, organizations with a higher 
percentage of formal sources would have a preference for insurgency.  
 
To measure informal sources, I analyze changes in the overall volume of key resources namely, 





6.3 Formal factor 1: Bank secrecy-AML/CFT capability  
Bank secrecy is an agreement between a bank and its clients that all activities and deposits are 
secure, confidential, and private. Off-shore jurisdictions such as Panama and the Cayman 
Islands have exceptional bank secrecy. I focus on the bank secrecy of the country the 
organization is domiciled in, i.e., where they carry out their attacks, for two reasons. Firstly, it is 
difficult to analytically discern which foreign jurisdictions are of most interest. While there are 
jurisdictions in the region like Singapore, Hong Kong, and Macau that are traditionally viewed 
as hubs for money laundering, other factors such as geographical proximity, and language serve 
as serious confounders. Secondly and more importantly, regardless of the size and geographical 
distribution of organizations’ financial sources, all organizations would have to route money 
back to the country they are domiciled in. Hence, whatever route the finances undertake is 
secondary since organizations require a financial presence in their home jurisdictions. 
 
On the other hand, anti-money laundering and combat (the) financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) 
are technical standards that deter, detect, and prevent criminal behavior. Policies include  
mandating banks to retain records and suspicious activity reporting (SAR) procedures for 
unusual and large transactions.  
 
Instead of treating bank secrecy and AML/CFT capabilities as discrete factors, I argue that bank 
secrecy and AML/CFT capabilities should be conceptualized more continuously. Jurisdictions 
that have high bank secrecy can mediate the negative impact of bank secrecy with AML/CFT 
procedures as organizations are most drawn to jurisdictions with high bank secrecy and low 
AML/CFT capabilities. It would hence be ill-conceived to interpret bank secrecy or AML/CFT 
capabilities without consideration of the other. 
I consider incorporation laws within the umbrella of AML/CFT measures. It is difficult to 
disentangle whether lax incorporation laws affect financial or informal financial sources more. 
On the one hand, money laundering via shell companies is a major challenge. Organizations that 
have significant dealings in producing and selling assets benefit from having front companies 
that disguise the illegitimate origins of these assets. I argue that incorporation laws affect the 
existence of shell companies more substantially than front organizations. Front companies, 
while arguably unethical, can be set up in any jurisdiction since the incorporation process 





companies, on the other hand, is easier in jurisdictions that explicitly have laws that explicitly 
tolerate and aid its existence.  
6.4 Formal factor 2: Size of financial industry-GNI  
Jurisdictions are most attractive when the economy has a high level of financialization. 
Financialization refers to the size of the financial sector as a percentage of total GDP. The higher 
the financialization, the greater gains an organization may have--not simply because of the 
plethora of accounts that render their activities less visible, but also because of the ease of 
transferring money within and between countries, and other money-making opportunities like 
investing in real estate. 
 
While the size of the financial industry is already a relative measure, I consider the size of the 
financial industry as a factor of GNI per capita. Banks and institutional investors are drawn to 
jurisdictions that are already rich. However, wealth per se is less of a concern for civil war 
organizations as compared to traditional financial agents. Hence, GNI serves as an important 
control to temper the attractiveness of the financial industry to the overall wealth of the 
jurisdiction. 
6.5 Informal factor 1: Exogenous price of assets  
The exogenous price of assets represents the attractiveness of an asset to an organization. I 
temper this with inflation and the exchange rate to contextualize and localize these gains.  
6.6 Informal factor 2: Quantity of assets 
The quantity of assets is a loose proxy for the organization’s level of asset production. While this 
measure is admittedly flawed given that licit goods are overwhelmingly produced by legal 
companies, the overall country-level production, like the financial sector size measure, provides 







Importantly, I do not deploy asset prices and quantity in the same manner scholars like Dube 
and Vargas have. Instead of trying to approximate the effect of exogenous changes in the price of 
assets via a labor market effect, I directly approximate how much organizations misappropriate 
from these assets. To control for the labor market, I consider assets in conjunction with 
unemployment.  Unemployment proxies the availability of labor and people’s willingness to sell 
their services to organizations in times of economic hardship. Though the relationship between 
unemployment and these assets is likely to be endogenous, this thesis is predominantly 
interested in discerning what movement of indicators are correlated with conflict intensity 
rather than establishing causality. Unemployment is an important control that ensures that the 
level of conflict intensity is indeed attributable to informal financial shifts, rather than a general 
increase in the recruitment of fighters.  
6.7 Special case of narcotics in Myanmar 
The data on narcotics is spotty and data on the quantity of drug seizures is more available than 
price or drug production volume estimates. Drug production is particularly a problem in 
Northeast Myanmar with groups such as the Shan, Wa, and Kachin being notorious for drug 
trafficking. Organizations hold monopolistic controlxxxvi on drug production and the high 
barriers to entry including learning the know-how, bribing chains of officials, and hiding 
laboratories imply high up-front fixed and variable costs. Hence, an organization that enters the 
drug business will likely already be relatively big with resources at its disposal.  
 
Though Southeast Asia is infamous for the ‘Golden Triangle’xxxvii of drug production between 
Thailand, Laos, and Myanmar, I only look at Myanmese civil war organizations because they 
have explicit connections to narcotics. While it is possible that Thai or other country’s 
organizations also engage in the narcotics trade, the lack of prior evidence renders potential 
findings questionable. While data that separate drug seizures in Myanmar by region are few and 
far between, I attempt to account for the chance element by differentiating Northeastern 






While narcotics are an informal financial source, I argue that the organizations’ monopolistic 
control of narcotics tempers the market volatility dimension licit goods have. As such, narcotics 
should be treated as a special case. Because of bargaining theory, I expect higher conflict 
intensity in contexts where the organization is weaker.  
 
6.8 Other control and amplification factors: Federal tax rate, military spending, 
corruption 
Federal tax rate serves as a control because it affects organizations’ choice of investing in formal 
and informal financial sources. The higher the federal tax, the more attractive cash-based 
sources are. Military spending proxies the strength of the military and ensures that the 
dependent variables reflect the strength of the organization and not the strength of the state.  
Corruption is also an important factor as it quantifies the organization’s ‘ease of doing business’. 
On the one hand, higher corruption allows organizations to accrue more financial resources, and 
hence, to launch more and deadlier attacks. According to bargaining theory, however, 
jurisdictions with higher corruption will have fewer attacks since governments are more willing 
to tolerate civil war organizations in exchange for financial incentives. I investigate which 
explanation is stronger in the results. 
 Formal  Informal  
Attractiveness  Bank secrecy-AML/CFT 
(substituting factors)  
Price of assets  
Potential gains  Size of financial sector 
moderated by GNI per capita 
Quantity of assets produced 
Control 1: Federal tax rate  Yes  Yes  
Control 2: Military spending  Yes  Yes  
Amplification factor: 
Corruption  
Less important  More important  





7. Hypotheses  
H1: The higher the bank secrecy, the lower the country’s AML/CFT capabilities, and the 
higher the percentage of trade misinvoicing the more political violence-related fatalities 
and the lower civilian fatalities as a percentage of total fatalities.  
 
H2 : The larger the size of the financial sector, the more political violence-related 
fatalities and the lower civilian fatalities as a percentage of total fatalities.  
 
H3: The higher the exogenous price of assets, the less political violence-related fatalities 
and the higher civilian fatalities as a percentage of total fatalities*.  
  
H4: The higher the volume of assets produced, the less political violence-related fatalities 
and the higher civilian fatalities as a percentage of total fatalities.  
*Assets included: steel, coal, natural gas, and oil.  
H5: Drug seizures and land area devoted to poppy production have no statistically 
significant impact on conflict intensity. 
8.  Empirical objectives, measurement, and data strategy 
In this thesis, I apply the theory of formal financial sources to the variation in conflict intensity 
in the Philippines, Thailand, Myanmar, Malaysia, and Indonesia from 1997 to 2019. I first 
construct unique datasets on bank secrecy and AML/CFT capabilities and gather data on the 
remaining independent and dependent variables. I attempt to maximize the validity of my 
theory by first conducting a simple panel analysis on the Walker model, as is, as a standard to 
compare my models to. 
 
Because the theory of financial source formality has little theoretical precedent, I compile a list 
of collinear but related variables such as international cooperation to maximize the empirical 





detect patterns in my variable choice. I also plot a simple correlation matrix to visualize 
potential multicollinearity issues.  
 
After validating the theory, I proceed to test the hypotheses from Section 7 using panel analyses. 
I focus on the results from a pooled OLS and fixed-effects model. The first negates differences 
over cases and time while the second assumes that there are case differences that are time-
invariant. While the first model will be better at validating financial source formality as a theory, 
the second model will highlight specific components of the model that are relevant to the 
Southeast Asian countries chosen. I conduct the Cochrane-Orcutt procedure for models that fail 
the Breusch-Godfrey test for autocorrelation.  
 
8.1 Missing data strategy  
I fill missing data in with an average or the last recorded variable. I also conduct regressions 
excluding incomplete cases in the annex to test the robustness of the imputation. I do not 
impute asset prices because of the volatility of markets.  
8.2 Independent variables data sources 
For the structural variables, I rely on data from the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) to 
measure government AML/CFT capacity; Transparency International to measure corruption; 
World Bank for data on GNI, unemployment, inflation, size of the financial sector, exchange 
rate, military spending, and federal taxation. I rely on the United Nations International Trade 
Statistics Database (COMTRADE) for data on trade misinvoicing. To analyze asset production 
data, I rely on data from the World Steel Organization for steel production, International Energy 
Agency for crude oil, natural gas, and coal production.  
 
Deriving exogenous price data is always tricky. I use data from the World Bank’s ‘pink sheet’ on 
prices of primary commodities for data on coal, crude oil, natural gas, and coal. Crude oil prices 
are an average of three leading measures: Brent, Dubai, and West Texas Intermediary; natural 
gas prices an average of prices in the US, Europe, and Japan; coal an average of Australian and 
South African prices. Obtaining historical price data on steel was particularly challenging given 
that steel is not a primary commodity. Instead, I rely on the producer price index from the 






8.3 Dependent variable sources  
I primarily rely on data from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP). In particular, I 
aggregate total deaths and the percentage of civilian deaths variables. I transform the data into 
an organization-year and country-year dataset and test the different levels of effects. For the 
organization-year analyses, I cluster standard errors and the country-year level since the 
independent variables are all at the country-year level.  
 
UCDP data  
The Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) based in Uppsala University collects data on 
organized violence. The UCDP data covers three dyads: (A) State-based: either conflict between 
two states or between a state and a rebel group (B) Non-state violence: violence between two 
armed groups neither of which is the government and (C) One-sided violence: use of armed 
force by a state or an armed group against civilians. All three types of violence require dyads to 
reach a twenty-five-death thresholdxxxviii. I include all dyads with the exception of government on 
civilian violence. UCDP incident inclusion criteria are as follows: “The incidence of the use of 
armed force by an organized actor against another organized actor, or against civilians, resulting 
in at least 1 direct death in either the best, low or high estimate categories at a specific location 
and for a specific temporal duration.” 
 







Figure 7: Distribution of sum of political violence-related deaths from 1997-2019 (UCDP) 
 
 











Figure 9: Animated heat map of variation in total deaths (UCDP)  
 
From Figure 5, Indonesia has had an observable decline in the number of deaths from organized 
violence and Malaysia has had few deaths from 2013-2017. Thailand has had steady deaths with 
the exception of a gentle peak between 2003 and 2013. Myanmar and Philippines have had 
varying deaths. Cross-referencing Figure 4, with the exception of Myanmar that had a noticeably 
downward trend in the percentage of civilians killed, and Philippines that has had a steady 10-
20% of civilians killed, Indonesian, Malaysian, and Myanmese organizations have targeted 


















Abbreviation Organization Country  
MILF Moro Islamic Liberation Front Philippines  
ASG Abu Sayyaf Group Philippines  
CPP Communist Party of Philippines  Philippines  
Patani Insurgents Pattani United Liberation Organisation Thailand  
KNU Karen National Union Myanmar  
GAM Gerakan Aceh Merdeka  Indonesia  





BIFM Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters Philippines  
IS Islamic State  Extra-regional (MENA) 
ULA United League of Arakan  Myanmar  
MNDAA Myanmar National Democratic 
Alliance Army  
Myanmar  
Dayak Dayak people  Indonesia  
NSCN-K National Socialist Council of Nagaland Extra-regional (India) 
PSLF Palaung State Liberation Front Myanmar 
RCSS Restoration Council of Shan State Myanmar 
ARSA Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army Myanmar 




Figure 10, 11: Major organizations linked to fatalities 
 
 




The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) is an intergovernmental organization inaugurated in 
1989 by the G7 to combat money launderingxxxix. There are forty recommendations, eleven 
immediate outcomes, and nine special recommendations. Recommendations refer to technical 
compliance to the required legal and institutional framework while immediate outcomes 
evaluate the adequacy of enforcement of these technical standards. All recommendations and 





special recommendations follow the same logic as the recommendations but were conceived to 
address the financing of terrorism specifically. 
 
Recommendations are scored NC, PC, LC, and C (not compliant, partially compliant, largely 
compliant, and compliant). Immediate outcomes are scored low, medium, and substantial.   
 
To evaluate these standards, member states undergo mutual evaluations which are peer reviews 
within geographical groups, such as the Asia-Pacific Group (APG). It is crucial to note that 
mutual evaluations do not happen in a predictable timeframe. Assuming that a country has its 
first mutual evaluation report (MER) in 2002, the country would likely undergo a follow-up 
evaluation in the next few years. Follow-up evaluations typically do not change ratings but cover 
the progress states have made in strengthening AML/CFT systems previously deemed 
inadequate. Though FATF mandates that follow-up assessments should be conducted five years 
after the first MER, in reality, gaps between MERs appear to range anywhere from five to ten 
years.  
 
This presents a methodological challenge as the ratings assume that changes in 
recommendation compliance only occur in the year that a new MER is issued. To allow for the 
most minute gradations possible, I scan through all mutual evaluations to pick out the specific 
legislation that caused the rating changes. E.g., If Country X’s Recommendation 5 was rated PC 
in 2008 and LC in 2013, I do not simply score PC; 2009: PC; 2010: PC; 2011: PC; 2012: PC; 
2013: LC. Instead, if the report states that the 2008 rating was due to important legislation in 
2004 and 2013, in 2011, I score 2004: PC 2005: PC, …, 2011:LC.  
 
Adding to the difficulty, FATF changed and reordered its recommendations in 2012. While most 
recommendations have a clear cognate, some do not, or have multiple cognates. I lay out these 
pairs below, but it must be highlighted that some recommendation pairs are not total twins.  
 
 




Financial institutions are required to identify, 






money laundering  
National coordination to combat money laundering  II XXXI 
Money laundering should be criminalized  III I 
Police have the right to confiscate and freeze ML/FT 
assets  
IV III 
Terrorist financing should be criminalized  V - 
Targeted sanctions against money 
laundering/financial terrorism  
VI - 
Targeted sanctions against money 
laundering/financial terrorism related to 
proliferationcc 
VII XVII 
Countries need to ensure that non-profit 
organizations are legitimate  
VIII - 
Financial secrecy laws cannot inhibit the 
implementation of FATF recommendations  
IX IV 
Customer due diligence and no anonymous 
accounts  
X  V 
Keep financial records  XI X 
Protection measures against politically exposed 
persons (PEPs) 
XII VI 
Protection measures against correspondent banking XIII VII 
Protection against money and value transfer 
services  
XIV - 
Protection against new technologies  XV VIII 





Reliance on third parties in the know-your-
customer (KYC) process  
XVII IX 
Entities’ AML/CFT regulations must extend to 
foreign branches 
XVIII XXII 
Financial institutions need to deploy enhanced due 
diligence screening against partners and flows from 
high-risk countries  
XIX XXI 
Reporting suspicious transactions  XX XI 
Tipping off  XXI XIV 
Due diligence for non-financial entities  XXII XII 
Other legal obligations for non-financial entities  XXIII XVI 
Beneficial ownership transparency requirements of 
legal persons 
XXIV XXXIII 
Beneficial ownership transparency requirements of 
legal entities  
XXV XXXIV 
Financial institutions are subject to adequate 
regulation and supervision 
XXVI XXIII 
Supervisors’ powers XXVII XXIX 
Regulation of non-financial entities XXVIII XX, XXIV 
Financial Intelligence Units (FIUs) XXIX XIII, XXVI 
Designated authorities have responsibility for 
AML/CFT investigations  
XXX XXVII 
Authorities should be able to obtain information 
when investigating potential offences 
XXXI XXVIII 





Availability of statistics on AML system  XXXIII XXXII 
Authorities should provide guidelines for 
institutions  
XXXIV XXV 
Countries to sanction institutions and natural 
persons who flout regulations  
XXXV XVII 
Countries should ratify treaties such as the Vienna 
Convention, 1988; the Palermo Convention, 2000; 
the United Nations Convention against 
Corruption, 2003; and the Terrorist Financing 
Convention, 1999 
XXXVI XXXV 
Countries should provide mutual legal assistance to 
one another  
XXXVII XXXVI, XXXVII 
Countries should assist one another in seizing and 
confiscating laundered assets  
XXXVIII XXXVIII 
Countries should assist one another in extraditing 
offenders  
XXXIX XXXIX 
Countries should assist one another in AML/CFT 
and respond spontaneously and on request  
XXXX XXXX 
Where not possible, countries should levy civil and 
administrative liability on ML/CF offences 
- II 
Financial institutions should develop internal 
programs against ML/TF 
- XV 
Countries should not approve of the operation or 
continued operation of shell banks  
- XVIII 
Financial institutions report all domestic and 







Countries should have competent authorities in 
charge of AML/CFT 
- XXX 
Figure 12: pre-2012 and 2012 FATF recommendation pairs 
 
Bank Secrecy  
 
The Walker model calls for bank secrecy to be scored on a scale from 0 (no secrecy laws) to 5 
(bank secrecy laws enforced). However, the model does not specify a scoring method. As such, I 
used the method described by the Tax Justice Network (TJN)xl in its financial secrecy index. The 
TJN is an independent, United Kingdom-based non-governmental organization (NGO) 
dedicated to the research of international tax and financial regulation. While the TJN has 
reviewed some of the countries in question, the ranking does not stretch back to 1997 or include 
Myanmar.  
 
Broadly speaking, bank secrecy is a conditional agreement between financial institutions and 
clients that all foregoing activities and information is secure, confidential, and private. Though 
bank secrecy has its historical roots in 17th century Italy, widespread modern bank secrecy 
originated from the Swiss Banking Act of 1934 that criminalized the disclosure of client 
information without the client’s consent. The act triggered a huge capital flight into Switzerland 
that motivated other states to impose similar regulations to encourage deposits and prevent 
future capital flight. Bank secrecy, while necessary, has a tenuous relationship with security as 
investigators often have a high burden of proof to warrant the extraction of privileged customer 
information. Investigators in off-shore financial centers have very little legal recourse.  
 
Bank secrecy is but one of many indicators the TJN analyzes for the overall financial secrecy 
score. The TJN looks beyond statutes and assesses how breaches of bank secrecy are 
criminalized such as if authorities can access suspicious account information without separate 
authorization, or if there are any undue notification requirements or appeal rights against 
obtaining said information. The TJN also includes compliance with FATF recommendations 5 
and 10.   
 
Criterion Secrecy score 





Breaching bank secrecy may lead to a custodial sentence  (20) 
Anonymous accounts allowed (FATF Recommendation 5)  (20) 
Financial institutions mandated to keep records of more than five years 
(FATF Recommendation 10)  
(20) 
No reporting of large transactions  (20)  
Inadequate powers to obtain banking information  (10)  
Undue rights of appeal against attempts to obtain banking information  (10)  
     
Figure 13: The Tax Justice Network’s bank secrecy methodology  
 
The TJN is problematic for three reasons. Firstly, the wording of the methodology is unclear. 
Intuitively, the higher the score, the ‘worse’ the situation is and the higher the bank secrecy. 
Hence, the wording should be “financial institutions are not mandated to keep records of more 
than five years”.  
 
Secondly, the matching between criteria and recommendations appears questionable. Though it 
is true that Recommendation 5 covered anonymous accounts and Recommendation 10 covered 
record-keeping, FATF made significant changes to their recommendations in 2012, rendering 
the pairing moot. Post-2012, anonymous accounts are covered by Recommendation 10 and 
record-keeping, Recommendation 11.  
 
Thirdly, the pairing of the criteria of anonymous accounts and record-keeping seems arbitrary 
since there are FATF recommendations on the flagging of large transactions and the powers of 
investigative organizations. I thus include Recommendations 20 (R.11, pre-2012) that covers the 
reporting of suspicious transactions, and Recommendations 31 (R.28) that covers the powers of 
investigative institutions. I also include a new category: AML/CFT (R. 9 or R. 4 pre-2012). I use 
the FATF recommendation on suspicious transaction reporting (STR) because illicit 
transactions are not necessarily large.  
 






Criterion Secrecy score 
(maximum 110)  
Breaching bank secrecy may lead to a custodial sentence  (20) 
Customer due diligence (FATF Recommendation 10 (5 pre-2012))  (20) 
Financial institutions not mandated to keep records of more than five 
years FATF Recommendation 11. (R.10 pre-2012)  
(20) 
No reporting of large or suspicious transactions Recommendation 20 
(R.11) 
(20)  
Inadequate powers to obtain banking information Recommendation 31 
(R.28) 
(10)  
Financial secrecy laws inhibit the implementation of FATF 
recommendations Recommendation 9 (R.4) 
(10) 
Undue rights of appeal against attempts to obtain banking information  (10)  
 
Figure 14: Modified bank secrecy methodology  
 
It is crucial to caveat that financial secrecy and bank secrecy are not synonymous though most 
uses of the term ‘financial secrecy’ seem to stem from TJN. According to the TJN, bank secrecy 
is but one of three facets of financial secrecy, the other two being (A) Corporate secrecy: states 
that tolerate legal entities where the beneficial ownership is secret or muddied (B) Non-
cooperation: jurisdictions that erect barriers for investigative cooperation and information 
exchange through actions such as refusing to collate information. FATF first evaluates whether 
there is an explicit section in a state’s AML law that establishes the supremacy of AML concerns 
over bank or professional secrecy. FATF also evaluates financial institutions based on their 
measures in establishing secure correspondent banking relationships and ensuring that 
beneficial ownership of originators is established for wire transfers. While there are overlaps 
with corporate secrecy and non-cooperation, FATF Recommendation 9 appears to 






I keep the double weight of the criminalization of the breach of bank secrecy and double the 
category of customer due diligence, record-keeping, and reporting of large transactions as these 
categories affect both the occurrence and the detection of illicit financial activity. While the 
categories of powers to obtain bank information, financial secrecy, and rights to appeal are 
important, they affect the investigative process after detection and are hence less material to the 
puzzle at hand. After scoring countries out of 110, I normalize the values.  
 
I code FATF recommendations on a scale of 10 to 0 with 10=NC, 6.67=PC, 3.33=LC, 0=C.  
 
 
Figure 15: Bank secrecy 
 
All countries show a general downward trend in bank secrecy, with Philippines (2018 to 2019) 
and Thailand (1998 to 1999) having particularly large shifts. As of 2019, Myanmar has the least 
and Thailand has the most bank secrecy compared to the other countries.  
 






The Walker model specifies that the government attitude towards money laundering should be 
scored 0 (strongly anti-money laundering) and 4 (tolerant of money laundering). Despite this, 
the model does not specify a methodology for evaluating government attitude. For this category 
to be analytically useful, it needs to be distinct from bank secrecy and the other variables. As 
such, I constructed a methodology based on compliance with FATF recommendations that were 
assessed both pre-2012 and post-2012 and not related to bank secrecy. I also exclude (2012 
coded) Recommendations 37-40 that cover international cooperation and include it in a 
separate category below to test if technical standards and international cooperation have 
differing impacts on conflict intensity. I exclude Recommendation 29 (2012) because the 
Egmont Group are the primary organizers of FIUs and a distinct factor in the model.  
 
Hence, I include the following twenty-one FATF recommendations (2012 coding): II, III, IV, VII, 
XII, XIII, XV, XVII, XVIII, XIX, XXII, XXIII, XXIV, XXV, XXVI, XXVII, XXVII, XXIX, XXX, XXXIII, 
XXXV. 
 
Figure 16: AML/CFT capabilities 
 
From Figure 12, similar to bank secrecy, all five countries have become increasingly compliant to 
the FATF standards in question. Myanmar still has considerable technical deficiencies while 







Government attitude (Compliance with international standards & cooperation) 
 
Though Walker does not include compliance with international law, I include the variable to 
analyze if treaty and international law compliance adds further explanatory power to the model. 
I modify FATF Recommendation 36 because the FATF rating does not analyze regional treaties 
from the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) or analyze all of the relevant UN 
treaties as seen in the table below. Recommendations 37-40 are useful, however, because they 
comprehensively map countries’ cooperation with bilateral and multilateral efforts to curb 
money laundering.  
 
Treaty  Organization  
Included in 
FATF? 
1980 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties  UN Y 
1997 International Convention for the Suppression of 
Terrorist Bombings UN  N 
1997 Ministerial Understanding on Cooperation in Finance ASEAN N 
1999 International Convention for the Suppression of the 
Financing of Terrorism UN Y 
2000 United Nations Convention against Transnational 
Organized Crime UN Y 
2000 Protocol to Amend the Ministerial Understanding on 
ASEAN Cooperation in Finance ASEAN N 
2000 United Nations Convention against Transnational 
Organized Crime (Palermo Convention)  UN  Y  
2003 Agreement on the Establishment of the ASEAN+3 
Finance Cooperation Fund ASEAN N 
2005 International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of 
Nuclear Terrorism UN N 





2007 ASEAN Convention on Counter Terrorism ASEAN  N 
 
Figure 17: List of all major international and regional treaties in Southeast Asia. See Annex for 
individual countries’ ratification status.  
 
I only count ratifications/accessions and not mere signing of treaties. When a country signs but 
does not ratify a treaty, it indicates an intention but not an obligation to abide by the terms of 
the treaty. I thus exclude mere signings because the intuition of the Walker model is to test 




Figure 18: International AML/CFT cooperation 
Similar to the variable government technical compliance, Myanmar has shown considerable 
resistance to cooperating with international standards. In contrast, Thailand has shown the 






Egmont Group  
The Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence Units (FIUs) is an international organization 
dedicated to cross-border intelligence sharing for AML and CFT purposes. FIUs do not have 
prosecutorial or enforcement authority, but rather act as information sharing agencies. Scholars 
such as Unger have also explicitly included Egmont membership in subsequent iterations of the 
Walker model.  
 
Country  Commencement  Official Date of Entry 
Philippines  2001  2005  
Myanmar  - - 
Thailand  1999 2009 
Indonesia  2003 2004 
Malaysia  2001  2003  
 
Figure 19: Egmont group membership 
 
I score countries 100 once they officially joined Egmont, if at all, and disregarded 
commencements for the same reason as why I exclude governments signing and not ratifying 




Like in the original Walker model, I measure corruption using the inverse of Transparency 
International’s Corruption Perception Index (CPI)xli. The CPI ranks states based on how corrupt 
experts and business executives perceive a country’s public sectors to be from 0 to 100 with 100 
indicating total transparency and 0 indicating high corruption. However, in the case of the 
Walker model, higher corruption scores represent more corruption. Thus, I take the inverse of 
the CPI scores (e.g., 4 over 10 becomes 6 over 10) and halve the resultant score to fit Walker’s 








Figure 20: International AML/CFT cooperation 
GNI per capita 
 












 Philippines Myanmar Thailand Malaysia Indonesia 
1997 16.34 -no data- 13.74 17.04 16.42 
1998 16.44 -no data- 13.72 17.16 16.12 
1999 16.56 -no data- 9.10 17.03 15.97 
2000 16.16 -no data- 9.09 16.86 15.97 
2001 14.21 -no data- 9.09 12.52 13.65 
2002 14.00 -no data- 8.83 11.90 13.53 
2003 10.72 -no data- 8.86 12.91 11.13 
2004 10.58 12.90 8.89 12.74 12.05 
2005 11.42 12.98 8.98 12.79 12.13 
2006 11.27 12.74 8.89 8.81 11.49 
2007 11.27 12.36 8.67 8.24 10.92 
2008 11.18 11.82 9.00 8.14 10.90 
2009 11.22 11.86 9.96 7.85 10.89 
2010 11.22 11.86 9.97 7.34 10.16 
2011 11.30 11.90 8.47 7.30 9.09 
2012 11.62 11.82 8.24 7.50 9.09 
2013 11.68 12.06 6.69 7.30 9.01 
2014 11.75 7.20 6.81 7.25 7.37 
2015 11.62 7.18 6.81 7.17 7.25 
2016 11.29 6.72 6.26 7.13 7.24 
2017 11.23 6.73 6.34 7.05 6.83 
2018 9.21 4.92 6.25 7.05 6.87 
2019 7.83 4.94 6.21 7.29 6.95 
Figure 22: Walker score without GNI per capita  
 
From Figure 17, in 2019, Philippines has the highest Walker score of 7.83 while Myanmar has 
the lowest Walker score of 4.94. From the Walker score alone, we would expect Philippines to 
have the most instances of political violence and terrorism and Myanmar to have the least. 





seem like the case. As such, it is necessary to also analyze the individual categories correlation 
with conflict intensity. 
 
 Philippines Myanmar Thailand Malaysia Indonesia 
1997 20092.54 -no data- 36826.18 78727.40 18065.67 
1998 19722.48 -no data- 28531.59 62449.89 10639.19 
1999 19535.37 -no data- 18015.19 57568.54 9105.47 
2000 18586.44 -no data- 17988.81 58343.09 9260.37 
2001 16481.08 -no data- 17807.11 44463.63 9828.05 
2002 15821.96 -no data- 17567.20 45086.75 10690.50 
2003 12547.85 -no data- 19317.15 53725.04 10018.33 
2004 13642.32 2837.35 22494.72 60407.53 13014.09 
2005 15756.89 3503.29 25065.05 67418.73 14798.99 
2006 16787.87 3694.39 27547.00 51429.49 15861.46 
2007 19385.06 4327.56 30613.04 54653.14 17478.25 
2008 22364.12 5553.77 35731.08 61105.93 21143.08 
2009 24337.42 7588.18 41235.53 59676.79 23424.04 
2010 26580.50 10078.05 45648.51 60634.69 25712.27 
2011 28464.41 12015.50 41943.01 66071.89 27346.16 
2012 33220.04 13352.68 45504.32 76317.03 32553.77 
2013 36896.05 14708.97 38285.10 79156.78 33597.19 
2014 39119.60 8856.40 39244.03 80752.59 26691.60 
2015 39273.20 9052.81 38903.37 76563.71 24855.39 
2016 38964.78 8602.52 35680.01 72358.20 24623.89 
2017 39629.07 8687.01 37784.31 70065.93 24125.86 
2018 34165.39 6747.22 41248.02 74647.71 26434.66 
2019 30148.20 6868.89 45082.42 81635.53 28131.89 
Figure 23: Walker scores with GNP per capita (to two decimal places) 
 
After multiplying the GNP per capita to the Walker scores, Myanmar has the lowest and 
Malaysia the highest score. Again, this does not seem like the case preliminarily referencing the 
UCDP and GTD data, as it would imply that there is strongest conflict intensity in Malaysia and 






Non-Walker model factors  
Unemployment as a % of total labor force (modeled on ILO estimate) 
The higher the unemployment rate, the lower the opportunity cost of joining political violent 
organizations. Used as a control for the labor market effect. Across the board, unemployment 
has been relatively stagnant, with a spike in 1997 for Thailand and an increasing trend in 
Indonesia from 1997 to 2008. This indicates that the labor market effect, i.e. individuals joining 




Figure 24: Unemployment % 
 
Inflation percentage  
The higher the inflation, the more ‘adjusted’ gains from assets are. Used as a control. Indonesia 
and Myanmar have experienced high market volatility from 1997 to 2008. This indicates that 





volatility, and that we would expect variations in conflict intensity for organizations that rely on 




Figure 25: Unemployment % 
 
Size of financial sector 
Percentage of domestic credit provided by the financial sector. The higher the percentage, the 
more important the Walker model factors and trade misinvoicing is likely to be in predicting 
political violence. The lower this percentage, the stronger informal value transfer systems are. 
Informal value transfer systems are systems that receive and transfer funds between individuals 
from different locations. Across the board, the size and importance of the financial industry has 
shown a decreasing trend from 1997 to 2008 and an increasing trend from 2008 to 1997. In line 











Federal tax  
Tax percentage of GDP. Used as a control given that government-inflicted deaths are included in 






Figure 27: Federal tax % 
 












Figure 28: Military spending % 
 
Trade misinvoicing  
 
As mentioned, the GFI defines trade misinvoicing as a method for moving money illicitly across 
borders, involving the deliberate falsification of the value, volume, and/or type of commodity in 
an international commercial transaction of goods or service by at least one party to the 
transaction. UN COMTRADE and other international bodies, such as the International 
Monetary Fund, provide year-by-year bilateral trade data. For a country dyad X and Y, 
COMTRADE records the total $USD value of goods X declared it exported to Y as well as the 
total $USD value of goods Y declared it imported from X. There is an explicit connection 
between declared exports and imports, and free on board (FOB) and cost, insurance, and freight 
(CIF). FOB has the named port of shipment and the seller must themselves load the goods on 
board and bear the risk. CIF has the named port of destination and though the seller pays the 
cost of freight and insurance, the buyer bears the risk once goods are loaded. In theory, the value 
of exports should equal imports. While small discrepancies are expected because of the cost of 
freight, insurance, duties, and lapses in record-keeping and the like, large discrepancies signal 
something more systematic and nefarious. Trade under-invoicing occurs when a country’s CIF 
imports are less than the corresponding value of FOB exports suggesting that exports are either 





exceed FOB, this discrepancy is also in the ‘wrong’ direction adding to the evidence of nefarious 
activity. On the other hand, trade over-invoicing occurs when a country’s CIF imports are more 
than the corresponding value of FOB exports above a ‘reasonable’ adjustment for the cost of 
freight, insurance, and duties.  
 
For all years, I analyze each country’s overall CIF incoming FOB from all trading partners. 
Because COMTRADE does not have data on Myanmar from 1997 to 2009, I use data from the 
IMF instead. I count export and re-export flows; import and re-import flows as per the standard 
convention in international trade. I also count the absolute value of misinvoicing since both 











Figure 30: Misinvoicing % 
 
The percentage of misinvoicing has dropped precipitously for Indonesia while Myanmar 
experienced a spike between 2008 and 2014. The percentage of misinvoicing has remained 
relatively stagnant for the other jurisdictions. In line with the theory, cumulative deaths follow a 
similar pattern.  
 
Asset data  
I included steel, coal, natural gas, and crude oil because fossil fuels, and natural gas because 
fossil fuels and metals have consistently been the region’s top exports.  
 













Figure 30: Steel 
 
Across the board, exogenous steel price has remained relatively stable. Steel production has 
increased by more than three-fold for Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand. This indicates that the 
gain for informal sources is high 
 







Figure 31: Coal 
 
Coal production has dramatically increased in Indonesia and the Philippines by more than 
500%. Malaysia has a less dramatic increase by 100%. Coal production has dropped in Thailand 
by close to 30%.  
 






Figure 32: Natural gas 
 
Natural gas production has shown a steady gradual increasing trend with the exception of a 
sharp drop in production in Thailand from 2004 to 2008.  
 









Figure 33: Crude oil 
 
Crude oil production has precipitously dropped in Indonesia, Thailand, and Malaysia in 2019. 
According to theory, this indicates that ceteris paribus, revenue from informal financial sources 
dropped during the same period.  
 
Narcotics (Myanmar)  
I obtain data on narcotics seizures and potential production levels from the UNODC. I take an 







































1997         155150 1680 
1998    404 5394 96 206 312 130300 1300 
1999    245 1473 24 333 314 89500 900 
2000 2492   159 1528 23 16 245 108700 1090 
2001 3023 518  97 1629 7 19 142 105000 1100 
2002 8742 415  334 1863 314 18 126 81400 830 
2003 372 102  569 1482 156 52 204 62200 810 
2004 779 0 69 974 607 59 39 396 44200 370 
2005 340 280 19 812 773 44 21 128 32800 310 
2006 1773 3 136 192 2321 1371 29 6154 21600 320 
2007 155 3 471 68 1274 1121 56 10972 27930 360 
2008 103 16 4 88 1463 206 80 2453 32170 410 
2009 2223 124 339 541 752 326 27 465 41450 330 
2010 204 226 0 89 765 98 35 147 37220 580 
2011 548 33 20 42 828 37 60 282 41240 610 
2012 1689 427 7 208 1470 46 29 81 42000 690 
2013 947 173 7 239 2357 72 115 66 47400 870 
2014 1176 47 108 435 1828 1109 102 134 49800 673 
2015 4645 2260 198 186 889 539 38 35 48750 647 
2016 9147 2460 55 769 944 472 47 22   
2017 6882 1108 107 662 1256 348 146 6 41500 550 
2018 9923 2878 45 1099 2829 554 146 30 42000 520 
2019 10111 9426 478 690 1949 8 87 96 42000  
Figure 34: Narcotics data (Myanmar) 
 
Variable terminology key and degree of precision 
 
Variable name  Precision Variable  





Cor  Imprecise (macro) Corruption  
Tax  Imprecise (macro) Federal tax rate as a % of GDP  
Milspend  Imprecise (macro) Military spending as a % of GDP  
Eg  Precise  Egmont  
Govatt  Precise but ineffectual International government cooperation  
Bank Secrecy  Precise bank secrecy  
Govtech  Precise AML/CFT capabilities  
Finsec  Imprecise Size of financial sector % GDP  
Steel  Imprecise Volume of steel production  
GNI  Imprecise GNI  
Misinvvalue  Very precise (exact amount of 
money siphoned) 
Absolute amount of misinvoicing  
Exchange  Imprecise Exchange rate compared to USD  
Coal  Imprecise Volume of coal production  
Ng  Imprecise Volume of natural gas 
Oil  Imprecise Volume of crude oil production  
Misinvper  Very precise (exact amount of 
money siphoned) 
Misinvoicing % of GNI   
Unemploy Imprecise and a confounder Unemployment %  
Figure 35: Variable names 
 
 
9. Results  
This section has three stages: (A) Exploratory, unsupervised learning to discover 
patterns in the data; (B) Supervised learning to test my hypotheses; (C) Predictive 
modeling to amalgamate both sections with the objective of predicting future conflict 
intensity. In (A), I use principal component analysis and hierarchical clustering; (B) 






9.1 Principal Component Analysis  
 
Formal financial sources variables: bank secrecy, AML/CFT capabilities, international 
cooperation, size of the financial sector, GNI, tax, corruption, and misinvoicing percentage. 
 
Informal financial sources variables: price and quantity of assets and corruption. 
 
I use principal component analysis (PCA) as an exploratory data analysis strategy. By rotating 
the data orthogonally to discover linearly uncorrelated eigenvectors, I find the independent 
variables that explain the most variance in conflict intensity.  
 
PCA analysis of all variables  
 
Figure 36: PCA (all) 
 
 
The first three components capture close to three-quarters of the variance in the data (73%).  







Figure 37: PCA (formal) 
 









However, no variable appears to contribute to the majority of variance in the first three 
components in any PCA analysis. This indicates that the dimensionality cannot be reduced 










9.2 Hierarchical clustering 
I exclude asset prices from the k-means because the variable is exogenously determined while 
the rest of the independent variables are determined from the countries of interest. Including 
asset prices will unfairly detect more similarities in the endogenous variables than present.  




Figure 42: hierarchical k-means 
 
Interestingly, we can infer that corruption and taxation have a small Euclidean distance. This 
indicates that corruption may not only explain the organization’s ‘ease of doing business’ but 
also act as a control to account for the government's ability to match organizations on the 
battlefield. It is also possible that corruption and tax substitute for one another, i.e. that 
countries with lower taxes may still have high government capacity if they siphon corruption 
revenue to build up the military. It is also possible that the two amplify one another, that 
jurisdictions with higher taxes also have higher corruption if the state is predominantly 






Similarly, as predicted, bank secrecy and AML/CFT capability have a small Euclidean distance 
indicating that they may be substitutes for one another. International government cooperation 
appears to be proximate to bank secrecy and AML/CFT capability, I hence exclude international 
cooperation altogether. Very interestingly, the volume of steel production has a relatively small 
Euclidean distance to absolute misinvoicing value. This indicates that steel may be particularly 
vulnerable to trade-based money laundering. Similarly, the small Euclidean distance between 
GNI and absolute misinvoicing value suggests that misinvoicing is most meaningful as a relative 
measure.  
 
The small Euclidean distance between exchange rate and coal production is interesting but not 
substantively relevant to this paper as it indicates that coal may be an asset that is 
predominantly exported in the region and hence is susceptible to exchange rate fluctuations. 
The proximity between natural gas and crude oil production is expected since both products 
come from the same primary source.  
 











Figure 43: hierarchical k-means 
 
Among the formal factors, bank secrecy and AML/CFT capabilities are highly correlated at 0.86, 
corruption and the size of the financial sector at -0.81 indicating that jurisdictions with lower 
taxes may ‘substitute’ their lack of funds with corrupt practices. International cooperation, 
govatt, is highly correlated with AML/CFT capabilities (0.84), bank secrecy (0.78), and Egmont 
group membership (0.76). The size of the financial sector is highly negatively correlated with 
corruption (-0.81) indicating that by substituting for informal value transfer systems, AML/CFT 
regimes in the banking system may be a good mechanism against money laundering. 
 
Among the informal factors, prices appear to be highly correlated between steel and coal (0.94) 
and natural gas and oil (0.81). Similarly, coal production is highly correlated with the exchange 
rate (0.9) indicating that the proceeds from coal may derive more heavily from international 
sales. Unemployment and misinvoicing percent are relatively correlated at 0.57. 
 





Because pooled effects are more case agnostic, they help test the validity of the theory as it is. 
Fixed effects assume that the specifics of the cases explain the variance in the dependent 
variables. Hence if the pooled effects is significant but the fixed effects model not, we can 
interpret that the variable may be important to the theory but not for the specific Southeast 
Asian country, and vice versa.  
 
Civilian targeting as an important indicator in the terrorism-insurgency mechanism  
As explained, richer organizations that I theorize to rely on formal financial sources are less 
likely to dip below the threshold where they would have to let troops go and hence would treat 
terrorism as a normal rather than an inferior good. On the flip side, civilian targeting serves as a 
litmus test for the importance of variables as an epiphenomenon or organizational decision-
making.   
9.4 Walker model 
I use the basic Walker model as a basis to compare the results of my model to.  
============================================================================================== 
                                            Dependent variable:                                
             --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                               deaths                                   civper                 
                      (1)                   (2)                 (3)                (4)         
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
score              47.725***              26.861*             -1.433*             0.280        
                    (12.950)             (14.681)             (0.798)            (0.755)       
                                                                                               
Constant            -117.305                                 33.008***                         
                   (140.873)                                  (8.681)                          
                                                                                               
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Observations           79                   79                  79                  79         
R2                   0.150                 0.044               0.040              0.002        
Adjusted R2          0.139                -0.022               0.028              -0.066       
F Statistic  13.581*** (df = 1; 77) 3.348* (df = 1; 73) 3.224* (df = 1; 77) 0.137 (df = 1; 73) 
============================================================================================== 
Note:                                                              *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
Figure 44: Walker model 
 
*1, 3 are pooled models and 2,4 are fixed effects models. I focus on the pooled effects and 
reference the fixed effects in brackets.  
 
The Walker score has an R squared of 0.150 (0.044) in explaining total deaths and 0.040 





higher the Walker score, the more deaths and the lower percentage of civilian deaths. To 
recapitulate, the Walker model is a composite measure composed of bank secrecy, AML/CFT 
capabilities, international cooperation on AML/CFT, Egmont group membership, and 
corruption--factors accounted for primarily by the formal financial model. I thus infer that the 
Walker model is somewhat in line with my theory. The Walker score, alone, however, is 
misleading because it does not take into account how factors such as bank secrecy and 
AML/CFT capabilities theoretically substitute for one another.  
 
9.5 Results (country-year)  
 
Formal sources 
   
 
                                                                     
========================================================================================================= 
                                                  Dependent variable:                                     
               ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
                                   deaths                                       civper                    
                         (1)                    (2)                     (3)                   (4)         
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
banksec               31.087***               20.250*                  0.655                 0.524        
                       (8.069)                (10.571)                (0.520)               (0.635)       
                                                                                                          
govtech                 4.687                  5.754                   0.561                 0.199        
                       (5.975)                (7.500)                 (0.385)               (0.451)       
                                                                                                          
banksecgovtech        -0.279***                -0.204                 -0.010                -0.004        
                       (0.093)                (0.123)                 (0.006)               (0.007)       
                                                                                                          
finsec                -6.814***               -4.750*                 0.261**               -0.158        
                       (1.817)                (2.763)                 (0.117)               (0.166)       
                                                                                                          
gni                     0.017                  0.023                   0.005                 0.001        
                       (0.081)                (0.087)                 (0.005)               (0.005)       
                                                                                                          
finsecgni              0.0002                  0.0002                -0.00003               0.00001       
                       (0.001)                (0.001)                (0.00004)             (0.00004)      
                                                                                                          
misinvper               1.313                 2.614**                -0.190***              -0.104        
                       (0.918)                (1.196)                 (0.059)               (0.072)       
                                                                                                          
eg                    3.472***                3.349***                 0.074                 0.002        
                       (0.935)                (1.067)                 (0.060)               (0.064)       
                                                                                                          
tax                  -211.445**               -120.825                -4.451                -4.569        
                      (98.401)               (113.226)                (6.339)               (6.804)       





taxcor                6.549***                 3.874                   0.150                 0.196        
                       (2.373)                (2.952)                 (0.153)               (0.177)       
                                                                                                          
cor                   -68.660*                -35.635                  1.596                -2.576        
                      (35.872)                (41.373)                (2.311)               (2.486)       
                                                                                                          
milspend              197.567**               120.766                 -2.825                -0.597        
                      (91.170)               (116.818)                (5.873)               (7.020)       
                                                                                                          
Constant              1,401.154                                      -109.641                             
                     (1,370.935)                                     (88.311)                             
                                                                                                          
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Observations             115                    115                     115                   115         
R2                      0.518                  0.315                   0.362                 0.095        
Adjusted R2             0.461                  0.203                   0.287                -0.053        
F Statistic    9.126*** (df = 12; 102) 3.760*** (df = 12; 98) 4.827*** (df = 12; 102) 0.857 (df = 12; 98) 
============================================================================================== 
 
Figure 45: Formal model (country-level) 
 
*To recapitulate, govtech is coded from 0 (very strong AML/CFT capabilities) to 100 (very weak 
AML/CFT capabilities). Similarly, e.g. is binary and coded from 100 (not a membership of 
Egmont group) and 0 (member of Egmont group).   
 
 
Bank secrecy-AML-CFT capabilities  
 
Both affirming and disproving Hypothesis 1, bank secrecy is strongly correlated at the 1% (10%) 
level with cumulative deaths at 31.087 (20.025). In line with theory, weak AML/CFT capabilities 
are also positively correlated with cumulative deaths but are not statistically significant. 
Furthermore, the interaction term banksecgovtech, is slightly negatively correlated with 
cumulative deaths at -0.279 the 1% level for the pooled model. This indicates that in and of 
themselves, bank secrecy and AML/CFT capabilities increase the likelihood of money 
laundering. However, when analyzed together, AML/CFT capabilities may temper the effect of 
high bank secrecy. This, again, emphasizes the importance of analyzing these factors as a system 
rather than discretely as the basic Walker model does.  
 
Bank secrecy and AML/CFT capabilities do not appear to have a statistically significant impact 
on civilian targeting. Interestingly, the interaction term banksecgovtech is not statistically 
significant either. Tying the empirical results back to the terrorism-insurgency mechanism, this 





less likely to experience large income shocks and to dip below a critical point where they would 
have to drop a substantial amount of their troops. As such, terrorist tactics continue to be an 
inferior good for these organizations. The fact that bank secrecy and AML/CFT capabilities are 




The percentage of misinvoicing to GDP is highly correlated with cumulative deaths at 2.614 (5%) 
and negatively correlated with civilian targeting at -0.190 (1%). This again is in line with the 
theory. Misinvoicing measures a formal financial source and hence organizations that rely on 
misinvoicing heavily are likely to be wealthier and employ large numbers of troops. The fact that 
misinvoicing is statistically significant with civilian targeting indicates that the financial gains 
from misinvoicing is so great that organizations with formal financial sources are less likely to 
dip below the aforementioned financial threshold explored in the terrorism-insurgency 
mechanism. As explained, trade misinvoicing is a very precise but narrow measure whereas 
bank secrecy and AML/CFT capabilities are imprecise but broad measures. Because the 
correlation with civilian targeting is statistically significant for the fixed model, I gather that 
misinvoicing is a better predictor of organizational finances than bank secrecy and AML/CFT 
capabilities are.  
 
I thus fail to reject Hypothesis 1 for the country-level effects  
 
Size of the financial sector  
To recapitulate, the size of the financial sector is the percentage of credit provided by banks to 
industry and businesses. The size of the financial sector is negatively correlated with cumulative 
deaths at -6.814 (-4.750) at the 1% and 10% levels, and 0.261 with civilian targeting at the 5% 
level. However, the effect of the financial sector is close to 0 once interacted with gni, though the 
interaction term finsecgni is not statistically significant. Broadly, this indicates that contrary to 
the theory, the financial sector may actually temper the gains from formal sources because as 
interpreted from the correlation matrix, the formal sector may substitute for the informal value 
transfer system that has little to no AML/CFT controls. The positive correlation between the size 
of the financial sector and civilian targeting indicates that organizations that rely on the 






There are two possible explanations for this. Firstly, it is possible that organizations significantly 
rely on international networks. The local bank account may simply receive funds from overseas 
and hence not show up in the financial sector indicator. The trade misinvoicing results add 
further weight to this interpretation. Secondly, it is possible that organizations simply do not 
rely on front businesses as much as methods like misinvoicing. However, again, the interaction 
term’s small but not statistically significant correlation suggests that GNI is a confounder  
 
I weakly fail to reject Hypothesis 2 but caveat that there is insufficient evidence 
that GNI does not negate the impact of the size of the financial sector.  
    
Other observations 
Egmont group membership is strongly correlated with cumulative deaths at 3.472 (1%) in the 
pooled regression and 3.349 (1%) for the fixed effects. This indicates that like bank secrecy and 
AML/CFT capabilities, not having a financial intelligence unit is aids organizations seeking 
financial gains from formal financial sources, but that the absence of a financial intelligence unit 
does not temper money laundering to a degree in which organizations would not cross the 
threshold in the terrorism-insurgency mechanism (as indicated with trade misinvoicing).  
 
Corruption is surprisingly negatively correlated with cumulative deaths in the pooled model at -
68.660 (1%). This indicates that as explored in the unsupervised and exploratory analysis, 
corruption may be substituting for taxes in proxying for government strength. This also 
vindicates bargaining theory as specific personnel within the military/government may be more 
willing to tolerate civil war organizations in exchange for financial incentives. 
 
This is further indicated by the negative correlation between tax and cumulative deaths -211.445 
(1%) for the pooled model. However, the fact that the interaction term, taxcor, is positively 
correlated with cumulative deaths at 6.549 (1%) indicates that corruption may temper financial 





                                                      Dependent variable:                                      
                  -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                                      deaths                                        civper                     






coal                     -0.003**                -0.003**                -0.0001               -0.0002**       
                          (0.001)                (0.001)                (0.0001)               (0.0001)        
                                                                                                               
coalprice                  1.517                  2.197                   0.059                  0.078         
                          (2.685)                (2.463)                 (0.141)                (0.139)        
                                                                                                               
oil                       -0.0004                -0.0005                0.0005***               0.00004        
                          (0.002)                (0.003)                (0.0001)               (0.0002)        
                                                                                                               
oilprice                   2.409                  1.018                  -0.197                 -0.250         
                          (3.027)                (2.836)                 (0.159)                (0.160)        
                                                                                                               
ng                      -0.0002***               -0.0001               -0.00002***            -0.00001**       
                         (0.0001)                (0.0001)               (0.00000)              (0.00001)       
                                                                                                               
ngprice                   -7.823                  20.879                  1.783                 2.570**        
                         (22.421)                (22.713)                (1.181)                (1.279)        
                                                                                                               
steel                     -0.015                  0.010                   0.002                 -0.0004        
                          (0.024)                (0.029)                 (0.001)                (0.002)        
                                                                                                               
steelprice                -1.898                  -3.641                  0.136                  0.167         
                          (2.518)                (2.406)                 (0.133)                (0.135)        
                                                                                                               
unemploy                  24.772               -160.663***               -1.438                 -4.015         
                         (29.471)                (56.910)                (1.552)                (3.205)        
                                                                                                               
inflation                -6.863**               -8.038***                -0.109                 -0.009         
                          (3.014)                (2.892)                 (0.159)                (0.163)        
                                                                                                               
exchange                  0.062**                 0.017                   0.002                  0.003         
                          (0.030)                (0.033)                 (0.002)                (0.002)        
                                                                                                               
milspend                 -118.758                -95.716                  2.841                  7.269         
                         (109.802)              (105.269)                (5.782)                (5.928)        
                                                                                                               
unemploymisinvper          0.387                 0.757**                 -0.011                 -0.008         
                          (0.317)                (0.311)                 (0.017)                (0.018)        
                                                                                                               
Constant                 811.607**                                       -14.517                               
                         (370.523)                                      (19.511)                               
                                                                                                               
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Observations                115                    115                     115                    115          
R2                         0.452                  0.335                   0.516                  0.228         
Adjusted R2                0.381                  0.218                   0.453                  0.093         
F Statistic       6.405*** (df = 13; 101) 3.756*** (df = 13; 97) 8.269*** (df = 13; 101) 2.204** (df = 13; 97) 
============================================================================================================== 
Note:                                                                              *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
 
Figure 46: Informal model (country-level) 






With the exception of natural gas price and civilian targeting in the fixed effects model, asset 
prices do not have a statistically significant effect on cumulative deaths and civilian targeting. 
This suggests that organizations in Southeast Asia may have significant natural gas activities. 
This, however, does not rule out that these armed organizations do not have dealing in steel, 
crude oil, and coal as it is possible that their actions are ‘hidden’ within the mass of production 
from the legitimate industry. It is plausible that the effect of natural gas prices ‘show up’ because 
the organizations have a higher market share of total asset production.  
 
In line with theory, the positive correlation between natural gas prices and civilian targeting at 
2.57 (5%) indicates that perceived natural gas gains, as an informal financial source, are less 
stable than formal ones. As a reverse to the results of misinvoicing, this indicates that 
organizations that rely on natural gas are more likely to dip below the threshold where terrorism 
becomes a normal good.  
 
I reject Hypothesis 3 for coal, steel, and crude oil and fail to reject it for natural 
gas.  
  
Contra Hypothesis 4, coal at -0.002 (5%) for the pooled model and natural gas production at -
0.00002 (1%) and -0.00001% (5%) for the fixed and pooled effect models respectively are 
negatively correlated with civilian targeting. My theory, however, predicts that asset production 
would be negatively correlated with cumulative deaths and positively correlated with civilian 
targeting. This indicates that organizations that rely on coal and natural gas and not likely to fall 
below the threshold where terrorism becomes a normal good. This suggests that the gains from 
coal and natural gas may be more than my theory anticipated--however, the negative correlation 
with cumulative deaths suggests that organizations that rely on these sources may simply be 
more risk-averse, being careful to not launch too many attacks that would put them in the 
financial red. This, again, harks back to the importance of distinguishing short-run and long-run 
behavior, the details of which are beyond the scope of this thesis. Oil, however, is in line with my 
theory as oil production is positively correlated with civilian targeting.  
 
The major limitation of this model is the confounding effect of the labor market mechanism. As 
Dube and Vargas and countless others have argued, the direction of these asset production 





revenues, and more a result of individuals flowing in and out of the conflict industry. This is 
strengthened by the results of unemployment and inflation. Unemployment is negatively 
correlated with cumulative deaths at -160.663 at the 1% level for the fixed effects model. 
Inflation, which is another proxy for financial hardship shows a similar effect--i.e. At -6.863 
(5%) and -8.038 (1%) for the pooled and fixed effects models respectively, the higher the 
inflation the less cumulative deaths because individuals are less likely to face financial hardship 
and be tempted to join an armed organization.  
 
I reject Hypothesis 4 for coal and natural gas but weakly fail to reject it for crude 
oil. I caveat that there is insufficient evidence that the results from this analysis 
distinguishes the financial proceeds from the production of assets from the labor 
market effect. 
   
Overall model 
I highlight variables that have markedly different coefficients than the individual formal and 
informal models.  
 
============================================================================================================= 
                                                      Dependent variable:                                     
                  ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                                     deaths                                        civper                     
                           (1)                    (2)                    (3)                    (4)           
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
banksec                  21.497**               25.206**                0.635                  0.816          
                         (10.605)               (11.588)               (0.562)                (0.628)         
                                                                                                              
govtech                   4.602                  13.865                 0.774*                0.996**         
                         (7.658)                (9.159)                (0.406)                (0.496)         
                                                                                                              
banksecgovtech            -0.190                -0.297**                -0.008                 -0.011         
                         (0.123)                (0.140)                (0.007)                (0.008)         
                                                                                                              
finsec                   -4.768*                 -0.528                 -0.079                 0.029          
                         (2.562)                (4.041)                (0.136)                (0.219)         
                                                                                                              
finsecgni                 -0.001                 -0.001                 0.0001                0.0001*         
                         (0.001)                (0.001)               (0.00005)               (0.0001)        
                                                                                                              
eg                       2.887**                2.841**                 0.053                  0.037          
                         (1.240)                (1.294)                (0.066)                (0.070)         
                                                                                                              
coal                      -0.002                 -0.002                -0.0001                -0.0001         
                         (0.002)                (0.002)                (0.0001)               (0.0001)        
                                                                                                              





                         (2.808)                (3.079)                (0.149)                (0.167)         
                                                                                                              
oil                      0.00000                 0.001                  0.0001                 0.0001         
                         (0.003)                (0.004)                (0.0001)               (0.0002)        
                                                                                                              
oilprice                  -0.395                 -0.631                 -0.235                 -0.226         
                         (3.321)                (3.292)                (0.176)                (0.178)         
                                                                                                              
ng                       -0.0001                -0.0002               -0.00001**             -0.00002**       
                         (0.0001)               (0.0002)              (0.00001)              (0.00001)        
                                                                                                              
ngprice                   -3.848                 15.646                 2.441*                3.592**         
                         (26.874)               (31.277)               (1.425)                (1.694)         
                                                                                                              
steel                     -0.029                 -0.006                 0.001                  0.001          
                         (0.029)                (0.036)                (0.002)                (0.002)         
                                                                                                              
steelprice                -0.969                 -1.986                 0.201                  0.069          
                         (2.947)                (3.584)                (0.156)                (0.194)         
                                                                                                              
unemploy                 -29.803               -138.017**              -5.909**               -7.737**        
                         (49.066)               (67.580)               (2.601)                (3.660)         
                                                                                                              
inflation                -6.215*                -6.798**                -0.109                 -0.095         
                         (3.257)                (3.275)                (0.173)                (0.177)         
                                                                                                              
exchange                  0.032                  0.020                 0.005**                 0.004*         
                         (0.035)                (0.038)                (0.002)                (0.002)         
                                                                                                              
unemploymisinvper         0.817                  0.970*                 0.041                  0.035          
                         (0.521)                (0.532)                (0.028)                (0.029)         
                                                                                                              
cor                      -19.810                -45.583                -5.193**               -6.857**        
                         (44.950)               (52.214)               (2.383)                (2.828)         
                                                                                                              
tax                      -74.037                -219.472              -14.381**              -17.623**        
                        (109.482)              (140.173)               (5.803)                (7.591)         
                                                                                                              
taxcor                    2.630                  5.918                 0.397***               0.477**         
                         (2.824)                (3.745)                (0.150)                (0.203)         
                                                                                                              
gni                       0.212*                 0.164                  -0.006                 -0.007         
                         (0.127)                (0.141)                (0.007)                (0.008)         
                                                                                                              
misinvper                 -2.047                 -1.595                 -0.242                 -0.173         
                         (2.830)                (2.960)                (0.150)                (0.160)         
                                                                                                              
milspend                 108.380                 85.044                 5.851                  6.878          
                        (126.503)              (141.304)               (6.706)                (7.653)         
                                                                                                              
Constant                  99.123                                       117.840                                
                       (1,966.979)                                    (104.264)                               






Observations               115                    115                    115                    115           
R2                        0.591                  0.419                  0.634                  0.376          
Adjusted R2               0.482                  0.230                  0.536                  0.173          
F Statistic       5.418*** (df = 24; 90) 2.586*** (df = 24; 86) 6.487*** (df = 24; 90) 2.164*** (df = 24; 86) 
============================================================================================================= 
Note:                                                                             *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
 
Figure 47: Overall model (country-level) 
Cochrane-Orcutt procedure  
I perform the Cochrane-Orcutt procedure for models that fail the Breusch-Godfrey test. This 
accounts for autocorrelation within the models.  
1: Cumulative deaths (pooled) 
Durbin-Watson statistic  
(original):    NA , p-value: NA 
(transformed): 2.02049 , p-value: 5.228e-02 
  
 coefficients:  
      (Intercept)           banksec           govtech    banksecgovtech            finsec  
       -35.110810         19.856362          4.518144         -0.173928         -5.296356  
        finsecgni                eg              coal         coalprice               oil  
        -0.001067          2.959165         -0.001917          0.234738         -0.000502  
         oilprice                ng           ngprice             steel        steelprice  
        -0.689506         -0.000052         -4.624296         -0.028158         -0.724569  
         unemploy         inflation          exchange unemploymisinvper               cor  
       -31.633197         -6.270182          0.032334          0.786020        -18.027495  
              tax            taxcor               gni         misinvper          milspend  
       -68.635029          2.684968          0.207113         -1.920291        127.473073 
 
 
2: Civilian targeting (pooled)  
Durbin-Watson statistic  
(original):    NA , p-value: NA 
(transformed): 1.98796 , p-value: 3.599e-02 
  
 coefficients:  
      (Intercept)           banksec           govtech    banksecgovtech            finsec  
       115.168940          0.602550          0.771118         -0.007350         -0.088905  
        finsecgni                eg              coal         coalprice               oil  
         0.000081          0.053818         -0.000061          0.144255          0.000136  
         oilprice                ng           ngprice             steel        steelprice  
        -0.241010         -0.000014          2.425312          0.000599          0.205771  
         unemploy         inflation          exchange unemploymisinvper               cor  
        -5.940131         -0.110061          0.004803          0.039781         -5.152733  
              tax            taxcor               gni         misinvper          milspend  








3: Cumulative deaths (fixed effects)  
number of interaction: 11 
 rho 0.781681 
 
Durbin-Watson statistic  
(original):    NA , p-value: NA 
(transformed): 2.30965 , p-value: 9.432e-01 
  
 coefficients:  
          banksec           govtech    banksecgovtech            finsec         finsecgni  
        16.377751         11.274473         -0.197531          4.703635         -0.002641  
               eg              coal         coalprice               oil          oilprice  
         0.689306         -0.000923         -2.019864          0.000865         -1.623852  
               ng           ngprice             steel        steelprice          unemploy  
         0.000003         27.217891          0.054167         -1.253240        -13.493706  
        inflation          exchange unemploymisinvper               cor               tax  
        -3.588144         -0.046184          0.372165         54.445585       -144.117018  
           taxcor               gni         misinvper          milspend  




4: Civilian targeting (fixed effects)  
number of interaction: 15 
 rho 0.790984 
 
Durbin-Watson statistic  
(original):    NA , p-value: NA 
(transformed): 2.28603 , p-value: 9.291e-01 
  
 coefficients:  
          banksec           govtech    banksecgovtech            finsec         finsecgni  
         0.983147          0.656508         -0.012502          0.257853          0.000083  
               eg              coal         coalprice               oil          oilprice  
         0.053293         -0.000021          0.087343         -0.000058         -0.274844  
               ng           ngprice             steel        steelprice          unemploy  
        -0.000011          1.582718         -0.003763          0.306117         -9.855538  
        inflation          exchange unemploymisinvper               cor               tax  
        -0.100797          0.004993         -0.036935         -6.390988        -17.741138  
           taxcor               gni         misinvper          milspend  
         0.524771         -0.012588          0.051509          5.745089 
 
 
Interestingly, misinvoicing is not statistically significant when combined. This suggests that 
there may be overlap between misinvoicing and the informal sources. It is possible that the coal, 





the exception of coal in Indonesia, Southeast Asia is a net importer of energy. While this does 
not disprove the intuition that these assets are being exported, it suggests that the probability of 
this misinvoicing mechanism occurring is less likely. More work needs to be done to expand the 
set of assets to other profitable goods and to distinguish countries by their net importing or net 
exporting status.  
 
Furthermore, AML/CFT capabilities is now positively correlated with civilian targeting at 0.774 
(0.996) at the 1% and 5% levels respectively, indicating that those that rely on formal sources are 
likely to fall below the threshold where terrorism becomes a normal good. A plausible 
explanation is that organizations that rely on trade misinvoicing coal, crude oil, steel, and coil 
may be significantly hamstrung by robust AML/CFT measures. 
 
Further research needs to be conducted to theorize how formal and informal sources interact 
with one another.  
            
 
Drug model: Myanmar  
======================================================================================================= 
                                                    Dependent variable:                                 
                    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                                    deaths                                    civper                    
                            (1)                 (2)                  (3)                   (4)          
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Methtablets                0.016               0.005               0.002**               0.002**        
                          (0.035)             (0.035)              (0.001)               (0.001)        
                                                                                                        
Crystalmeth               -0.010               0.044               -0.001                -0.001         
                          (0.071)             (0.056)              (0.001)               (0.001)        
                                                                                                        
Methpowder                 0.860                                   -0.010                               
                          (0.714)                                  (0.014)                              
                                                                                                        
Heroin                    -0.413              -0.416                0.006                 0.006         
                          (0.266)             (0.271)              (0.005)               (0.005)        
                                                                                                        
Rawopium                   0.084               0.060               0.0002                0.0004         
                          (0.087)             (0.087)              (0.002)               (0.002)        
                                                                                                        
Brownopium                -0.194              -0.116               -0.004                -0.005         
                          (0.224)             (0.219)              (0.004)               (0.004)        
                                                                                                        
Liquidopium               -0.809              -0.841               0.033*                0.033*         
                          (0.807)             (0.823)              (0.016)               (0.015)        
                                                                                                        
Lowgradeopium             -0.011               0.010                0.001                 0.001         





                                                                                                        
opiumlandarea             -0.007              -0.004              -0.00005               -0.0001        
                          (0.006)             (0.005)             (0.0001)              (0.0001)        
                                                                                                        
opiumpotential             0.481               0.263               -0.001                 0.002         
                          (0.679)             (0.668)              (0.013)               (0.012)        
                                                                                                        
unemployment              360.734             402.063              -1.767                -2.266         
                         (410.951)           (417.815)             (7.919)               (7.736)        
                                                                                                        
inflation                 -4.375              -4.218               -0.100                -0.102         
                          (4.543)             (4.634)              (0.088)               (0.086)        
                                                                                                        
Constant                  177.071             185.275               2.463                 2.364         
                         (362.062)           (369.335)             (6.977)               (6.838)        
                                                                                                        
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Observations                23                  23                   23                    23           
R2                         0.539               0.472                0.783                 0.771         
Adjusted R2               -0.014              -0.055                0.523                 0.542         
Residual Std. Error  233.420 (df = 10)   238.151 (df = 11)     4.498 (df = 10)       4.409 (df = 11)    
F Statistic         0.975 (df = 12; 10) 0.895 (df = 11; 11) 3.012** (df = 12; 10) 3.366** (df = 11; 11) 
======================================================================================================= 
Note:                                                                       *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
Figure 48: Drug model (country-level) 
 
*I conduct regressions 2 and 4 without meth powder because significant imputation was done. It 
appears that the results do not change significantly with the exclusion of meth powder.  
 
Across the drug seizure and potential data, only seizures of meth tablets and liquid opium are 
statistically significant and positively correlated with civilian targeting at the 5% and 1% levels 
respectively. This, however, does not simply suggest that meth tablets and liquid opium are 
driving Myanmese organizations’ finances. As explored in the concept of MPA and the 
complicity mechanism, the monopolistic nature of the narcotics industry implies that the de 
facto state of affairs should be cooperation. Hence, as expected, narcotics are not statistically 
significant with cumulative deaths. The positive correlations between meth tablets and liquid 
opium and civilian targeting can be interpreted in two ways. Firstly, it is possible that the 
terrorism-insurgency mechanism is at play: organizations that rely on these narcotics are likely 
to dip below the threshold where terrorism becomes a normal good. This, however, is arguably 
less likely given qualitative knowledge about the strength of the narcotics industry. It is more 
likely that organizations strike deals with the military and hence turn to terrorism to achieve 






Nevertheless, there is too much aggregation in this model. I separate Northeast from non-
Northeast Myanmese organizations below.  
 
I tentatively fail to reject Hypothesis 5 but caveat that there is significant 
aggregation in the model.  
9.6 Organization-level effects  
Coefficients that are substantially different from the country-level effects are bolded. I consider 
the pooled effects because a fixed effects model would overestimate the individual effects of each 
organization. There are insufficient numbers of cases for each organization to make such a 
measure meaningful.  
 
Formal sources  
 
======================================================= 
                               Dependent variable:      
                           ---------------------------- 
                               deaths        CIVPER     
                                (1)            (2)      
------------------------------------------------------- 
banksec                      28.925***       0.335**    
                              (6.447)        (0.139)    
                                                        
govtech                       10.765*       0.880***    
                              (6.015)        (0.129)    
                                                        
banksecgovtech               -0.285***      -0.008***   
                              (0.081)        (0.002)    
                                                        
finsec                        -6.153**      0.243***    
                              (2.391)        (0.051)    
                                                        
finsecgni                     -0.001*      -0.00003**   
                              (0.001)       (0.00001)   
                                                        
eg                            4.116***      0.089***    
                              (0.845)        (0.018)    
                                                        
cor                          -76.184**       -0.988     





                                                        
tax                         -373.504***     -7.930***   
                             (120.741)       (2.594)    
                                                        
taxcor                       10.597***      0.199***    
                              (2.834)        (0.061)    
                                                        
gni                           0.238***      0.007***    
                              (0.090)        (0.002)    
                                                        
misinvper                      1.084        -0.086***   
                              (0.997)        (0.021)    
                                                        
milspend                     235.582**       -3.558*    
                              (99.583)       (2.139)    
                                                        
Constant                     1,226.967       -7.312     
                            (1,322.494)     (28.412)    
                                                        
------------------------------------------------------- 
Observations                    385            385      
R2                             0.315          0.480     
Adjusted R2                    0.293          0.463     
F Statistic (df = 12; 372)   14.264***      28.575***   
======================================================= 
Note:                       *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
 
Figure 49: Formal model (organization-level) 
 
Cochrane-Orcutt procedure:  
Cumulative deaths:  
Durbin-Watson statistic  
(original):    NA , p-value: NA 
(transformed): 1.99944 , p-value: 3.781e-01 
  
 coefficients:  
   (Intercept)        banksec        govtech banksecgovtech         finsec      finsecgni  
   1175.439861      28.555932      10.722408      -0.282288      -6.205935      -0.001062  
            eg            cor            tax         taxcor            gni      misinvper  
      4.084305     -74.843960    -373.717638      10.613284       0.241715       1.056617  
      milspend  






Unlike the country-level effects, bank secrecy, AML/CFT capabilities, and Egmont membership 
are positively correlated with civilian targeting at 0.335 (5%), 0.880 (1%), and 0.089 (1%) 
respectively. This suggests that the more an organization relies on formal financial sources, the 
more likely they are to fall below the threshold where terrorism becomes a normal good. This 
suggests that formal financial sources are unstable sources for individual organizations. Hence, 
barring inter-organizational collaboration, I reject hypothesis 1 for organization-level 
effects.  
 
Informal sources  
======================================================= 
                               Dependent variable:      
                           ---------------------------- 
                               deaths        CIVPER     
                                (1)            (2)      
------------------------------------------------------- 
coal                           -0.001      -0.0001***   
                              (0.001)       (0.00003)   
                                                        
coalprice                      3.222         0.099**    
                              (2.069)        (0.042)    
                                                        
oil                            0.002        0.0002***   
                              (0.003)       (0.0001)    
                                                        
oilprice                       -1.292       -0.169***   
                              (2.282)        (0.046)    
                                                        
ng                           -0.0002***    -0.00001***  
                              (0.0001)      (0.00000)   
                                                        
ngprice                        3.499        1.320***    
                              (17.227)       (0.348)    
                                                        
steel                          -0.034       0.003***    
                              (0.035)        (0.001)    
                                                        
steelprice                     -2.301         0.045     
                              (1.932)        (0.039)    
                                                        





                              (22.345)       (0.451)    
                                                        
inflation                    -10.390***     -0.130***   
                              (2.146)        (0.043)    
                                                        
exchange                       0.027        0.002***    
                              (0.030)        (0.001)    
                                                        
milspend                      -127.221      6.224***    
                             (111.112)       (2.245)    
                                                        
unemploymisinvper             0.838***       -0.008     
                              (0.285)        (0.006)    
                                                        
Constant                    1,079.027***     -10.121    
                             (312.537)       (6.314)    
                                                        
------------------------------------------------------- 
Observations                    385            385      
R2                             0.273          0.511     
Adjusted R2                    0.247          0.494     
F Statistic (df = 13; 371)   10.697***      29.862***   
======================================================= 
Note:                       *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
 
Figure 50: Informal model (organization-level) 
Coal price, oil price, and steel are now statistically significant with civilian targeting. The 
positive correlations between coal price and oil price are in line with the theory while steel’s 
negative correlation is not. This yet again suggests that the imprecision of asset data is what is 
predominantly driving this empirical inconsistency. Furthermore, the fact that unemployment is 
now not statistically significant suggests that the labor market effect may be less present at the 
organization-level. 
 
Cochrane-Orcutt Procedure for civilian targeting 
Durbin-Watson statistic  
(original):    NA , p-value: NA 
(transformed): 2.00248 , p-value: 3.801e-01 
  
 coefficients:  
      (Intercept)              coal         coalprice               oil          oilprice  





               ng           ngprice             steel        steelprice          unemploy  
        -0.000249          3.872889         -0.035471         -2.316855         28.135611  
        inflation          exchange          milspend unemploymisinvper  
       -10.504638          0.027296       -133.318598          0.830403 
 
Overall model  
 
======================================================= 
                               Dependent variable:      
                           ---------------------------- 
                               deaths        civper     
                                (1)            (2)      
------------------------------------------------------- 
banksec                      20.778***       0.495**    
                              (7.978)        (0.197)    
                                                        
govtech                        2.939        0.934***    
                              (8.214)        (0.202)    
                                                        
banksecgovtech                -0.208**      -0.008***   
                              (0.105)        (0.003)    
                                                        
finsec                         -2.735        0.211**    
                              (3.323)        (0.082)    
                                                        
finsecgni                    -0.003***      0.00004**   
                              (0.001)       (0.00002)   
                                                        
eg                            4.760***      0.117***    
                              (0.989)        (0.024)    
                                                        
coal                           -0.002        0.00002    
                              (0.002)       (0.00004)   
                                                        
coalprice                      0.569          0.038     
                              (2.359)        (0.058)    
                                                        
oil                            0.001        0.0003***   
                              (0.003)       (0.0001)    
                                                        
oilprice                       -1.665       -0.259***   





                                                        
ng                            -0.0001      -0.00002***  
                              (0.0001)      (0.00000)   
                                                        
ngprice                        26.459         0.798     
                              (23.658)       (0.583)    
                                                        
steel                          0.008         -0.001     
                              (0.045)        (0.001)    
                                                        
steelprice                     -3.656       0.301***    
                              (2.650)        (0.065)    
                                                        
unemploy                       -8.680        -1.068     
                              (47.171)       (1.162)    
                                                        
inflation                     -5.882**      -0.147**    
                              (2.311)        (0.057)    
                                                        
exchange                       0.004        0.003***    
                              (0.037)        (0.001)    
                                                        
unemploymisinvper             1.162***      0.040***    
                              (0.447)        (0.011)    
                                                        
cor                            -3.649       -3.597***   
                              (38.452)       (0.948)    
                                                        
tax                          -272.613**    -14.344***   
                             (130.503)       (3.216)    
                                                        
taxcor                        7.280**       0.340***    
                              (3.167)        (0.078)    
                                                        
gni                           0.530***       0.00005    
                              (0.117)        (0.003)    
                                                        
misinvper                      -2.360       -0.233***   
                              (2.066)        (0.051)    
                                                        
milspend                     313.865**       -2.466     





                                                        
Constant                      -584.275       56.144     
                            (1,653.769)     (40.751)    
                                                        
------------------------------------------------------- 
Observations                    385            385      
R2                             0.403          0.687     
Adjusted R2                    0.363          0.666     
F Statistic (df = 24; 360)   10.114***      32.872***   
======================================================= 
Note:                       *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
 
Figure 51: Overall model (organization-level) 
 
Unlike the combined model for the country-level effects, there are no substantial changes when 
the organization-level effects for the formal and informal models are combined.  
                                                       
 
Cochrane-Orcutt procedure:  
Cumulative deaths  
number of interaction: 13 
 rho -0.079228 
 
Durbin-Watson statistic  
(original):    NA , p-value: NA 
(transformed): 2.01489 , p-value: 3.521e-01 
  
 coefficients:  
      (Intercept)           banksec           govtech    banksecgovtech            finsec  
      -323.194097         22.529276          2.793038         -0.224234         -2.612605  
        finsecgni                eg              coal         coalprice               oil  
        -0.002893          4.888826         -0.001337          1.007267          0.002260  
         oilprice                ng           ngprice             steel        steelprice  
        -1.732149         -0.000133         26.926317         -0.010143         -3.695063  
         unemploy         inflation          exchange unemploymisinvper               cor  
       -10.946263         -6.139388          0.004755          1.278575         -9.665492  
              tax            taxcor               gni         misinvper          milspend  




number of interaction: 16 






Durbin-Watson statistic  
(original):    NA , p-value: NA 
(transformed): 1.99974 , p-value: 3.243e-01 
  
 coefficients:  
      (Intercept)           banksec           govtech    banksecgovtech            finsec  
        56.405284          0.492695          0.930634         -0.007886          0.210517  
        finsecgni                eg              coal         coalprice               oil  
         0.000044          0.117560          0.000021          0.037266          0.000298  
         oilprice                ng           ngprice             steel        steelprice  
        -0.258944         -0.000020          0.786668         -0.000652          0.302288  
         unemploy         inflation          exchange unemploymisinvper               cor  
        -1.047863         -0.146677          0.002615          0.039743         -3.598275  
              tax            taxcor               gni         misinvper          milspend  





                                                    Dependent variable:                                      
               --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                       deaths                 civper                  deaths                 civper          
                        (1)                     (2)                    (3)                     (4)           
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Methtablets            0.016                 0.002***                 0.030                 0.002***         
                      (0.025)                (0.0004)                (0.018)                (0.0003)         
                                                                                                             
Crystalmeth            -0.009                 -0.001                  -0.034                 -0.0003         
                      (0.050)                 (0.001)                (0.036)                 (0.001)         
                                                                                                             
Methpowder             0.697                  -0.008                 1.484***                -0.011*         
                      (0.550)                 (0.008)                (0.394)                 (0.006)         
                                                                                                             
Heroin               -0.711***                 0.003                -0.527***               0.006***         
                      (0.211)                 (0.003)                (0.129)                 (0.002)         
                                                                                                             
Rawopium               0.116                   0.001                 0.142***                -0.0003         
                      (0.072)                 (0.001)                (0.042)                 (0.001)         
                                                                                                             
Brownopium            -0.278*                 -0.004*               -0.353***                -0.003*         
                      (0.140)                 (0.002)                (0.102)                 (0.001)         
                                                                                                             
Liquidopium            -0.907                0.037***                -0.756*                0.025***         
                      (0.764)                 (0.011)                (0.392)                 (0.006)         
                                                                                                             
Lowgradeopium          -0.025                 0.001**                 -0.021                0.001***         
                      (0.029)                (0.0004)                (0.021)                (0.0003)         
                                                                                                             
opiumlandarea          -0.004                 0.00001               -0.009***                -0.0001         





                                                                                                             
opiumpotential        -0.0003                 -0.008                  0.401                   0.003          
                      (0.527)                 (0.008)                (0.353)                 (0.005)         
                                                                                                             
unemploy              296.196                 -4.018                472.699**                5.096*          
                     (300.172)                (4.461)               (192.835)                (2.782)         
                                                                                                             
inflation              -4.725                -0.123**                -6.066**               -0.089**         
                      (3.959)                 (0.059)                (2.398)                 (0.035)         
                                                                                                             
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Observations             58                     58                      77                     77            
R2                     0.497                   0.773                  0.610                   0.792          
Adjusted R2            0.245                   0.659                  0.419                   0.690          
F Statistic    3.125*** (df = 12; 38) 10.768*** (df = 12; 38) 6.647*** (df = 12; 51) 16.162*** (df = 12; 51) 
============================================================================================================ 
Note:                                                                            *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
 
Figure 52: Drug model (organization-level) 
 
Regression 1 and 2 cover organizations that operate in the Northeast of Myanmar, i.e., in areas 
that grow poppies. Regression 3 and 4 cover non-Northeast Myanmese organizations.  
 
Interestingly, there is little difference in the correlation between narcotics data and conflict 
intensity for known producers of drugs and those that are not. It is possible that narcotics 
revenue and the complicity mechanism from bargaining theory tempers Northeast Myanmese 
organization’s MPA. The fact that unemployment is only significant for cumulative deaths for 
organizations not in drug-producing areas suggests that the labor market effect is stronger for 
non-narcotics organizations. This is plausibly because narcotics is the predominant source of 
income in drug-producing areas hence limiting what individuals can participate in besides the 
conflict intensity. 
 
It is extremely likely that there is more than meets the eye: if the authorities and organizations 
are complicit in drug smuggling, the seizures data would necessarily be contaminated. This is an 
unfortunate product of the nature of the data rather than a methodological problem. 
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Figure 53: Hypotheses evaluation 
Random forest  
Lastly, I conduct random forest analysis with a 10-fold cross-validation mechanism. While this 
method may be methodologically elegant, it is substantively questionable. For example, the most 
important variable in the variable importance plot for cumulative deaths is the exchange rate 
while substantively, the exchange rate is a control and should have no theoretical impact on 
cumulative deaths. Both models also have very high MSEs. Hence, when data is as spotty and 
imprecise as money laundering and conflict data, traditional big data approaches are unideal. It 
is possible, however, that the results of these random forests are more a product of the small 
dataset rather than the unreliability of the method itself. More research needs to be done to 
demonstrate the potential usefulness of these methods to conflict studies.  
Cumulative deaths 
Call: 
 randomForest(x = x, y = y, mtry = param$mtry, importance = TRUE)  
               Type of random forest: regression 





No. of variables tried at each split: 2 
 
          Mean of squared residuals: 29092.28 
                    % Var explained: 85.37 
 




 randomForest(x = x, y = y, mtry = param$mtry, importance = TRUE)  
               Type of random forest: regression 
                     Number of trees: 500 
No. of variables tried at each split: 23 
 
          Mean of squared residuals: 24.57952 








Figure 55: Variable importance plot for civilian targeting 
 
Figure 56:MSEs (1: cumulative deaths, 2: civilian targeting) 
 







2: 0.119806   5.530263   9.566641  10.628935  10.601929  29.620497   3.748734 
   1.980044 132.017514  79.603615 
 
Limitations and areas for future research  
There is a clear trend in the results: the more precise the measure, the more consistent it is in 
explaining conflict intensity. Across the board, trade misinvoicing appears to be the most 
consistent predictor of conflict intensity. While bank secrecy and AML/CFT capabilities show 
potential, more needs to be done to disaggregate the measures. Significant additional theorizing 
needs to be done to consider how formal and informal sources interact, specifically how bank 
secrecy, AML/CFT measures, and trade misinvoicing affect proceeds from assets. Methodically, 
more needs to be done to separate informal financial sources from the labor market effect. In 
effect, the empirics urge the need for precise measures: while it may be theoretically interesting 
to link asset prices and broad regulatory indicators like bank secrecy to conflict intensity, the 
lack of precision renders results confusing and at times, contradictory. It is no surprise that 
cross-sectional studies like Blair, Christensen, and Rudkin, find diverging results from the 
natural resources approach.  
 
Despite these limitations, this thesis has demonstrated the policy and theoretical motivations 
behind developing new measures that precisely link macro level indicators to organizational 
finances. The problem of money laundering in civil wars is best tackled through interdisciplinary 
approaches that meld ideas from economics, law enforcement, and political science.  
10. Policy recommendations and conclusion  
 
With the risk of violating Goodhart’s Law, this thesis shows the importance of monitoring 
financial indicators of money laundering. There are two main applications to CT and COIN 
operations. On a theoretical level, the choice between using CT or COIN methods can be 
confusing given the tautological use of the Political in political violence. By analyzing an 
organization’s specific correlations with these measures, however, policy-makers can empirically 
derive if the organization in question relies more on formal or informal sources.  
Empirical derivation is not enough, it is also important to consider spotty but important 





by default, not use insurgency because of complicity between the Tatmadaw and the 
organizations. This renders pure statistical analysis, like the random forest analysis, 
substantively questionable. Rather, policy-makers need to iteratively inform policies using both 
qualitative intelligence and quantitative data. As demonstrated, data on civil wars is extremely 
messy. Combined with data on money laundering that is as or arguably, messier, one needs to 
treat statistical results with an air of healthy skepticism. This again harks back to Goodhart’s 
Law as the social Heisenberg uncertainty principle. Rather than attempting to develop broad 
comprehensive models, more needs to be done to develop extremely precise measures.  
 
Secondly, my thesis shows that the division between the criminal and the political actor is an 
artificial one. Political actors weave in and out between the paradigms of criminality, 
insurgency, and terrorism when it suits their purposes. Governments need to ensure that there 
is better interoperability between police departments and military intelligence that traditionally 
deal with criminals and politically violent actors respectively. 
 
The fact that corruption is consistently negatively correlated with conflict intensity vindicates 
bargaining theory and indicates that state institutions have been complicit in aiding 
organizations become stronger. While this may temper conflict intensity in the short-term, it is 
an extremely myopic attitude since organizations merely become incrementally stronger in the 
long-term. At the risk of offering a typically Singaporean solution, it is important for countries to 
pay soldiers and police decent wages and to implement strong anti-corruption measures.  
 
Lastly, it goes without saying that there is an urgent need to develop counter trade misinvoicing 
mechanisms AML/CFT systems. While multinational banks have been responsible for BEPS 
schemes and may be negligently responsible for money laundering and the financing of 
terrorism., the results show that the alternative--informal value transfer systems--are 
significantly worse because of a total lack of regulatory standards. Financialization is neutral to 
the problem at hand. With strong AML/CFT systems, it can dramatically decrease the amount of 
money laundering in the system. With weak AML/CFT systems, financialization can exacerbate 









Independent variable tables  
 
Bank secrecy  
 
 
 Philippines Myanmar Thailand Malaysia Indonesia 
1997 87.88 81.82 93.94 90.91 90.91 
1998 87.88 81.82 93.94 90.91 90.91 
1999 87.88 81.82 63.65 90.91 90.91 
2000 87.88 81.82 63.65 90.91 90.91 
2001 81.83 81.82 63.65 62.13 75.26 
2002 81.83 72.73 63.65 62.13 75.26 
2003 60.63 72.73 63.65 62.13 59.61 
2004 60.63 72.73 63.65 62.13 59.61 
2005 60.63 72.73 63.65 62.13 59.61 
2006 60.63 72.73 63.65 36.37 58.10 
2007 60.63 72.73 63.65 36.37 54.56 
2008 60.63 69.70 66.68 36.37 54.56 
2009 60.63 69.70 66.68 36.37 54.56 
2010 60.63 69.70 66.68 33.34 50.02 
2011 60.63 69.70 57.59 33.34 42.44 
2012 60.63 69.70 57.59 33.34 42.44 
2013 60.63 69.70 48.50 33.34 42.44 
2014 60.63 40.92 48.50 33.34 33.34 
2015 60.63 40.92 48.50 33.34 33.34 
2016 60.63 36.38 48.50 33.34 33.34 





2018 48.50 24.25 48.50 33.34 33.34 
2019 39.40 24.25 48.50 33.34 33.34 
 
 
AML/CFT capabilities  
 
 Philippines Myanmar Thailand Malaysia Indonesia 
1997 96.67 96.67 96.67 96.67 98.28 
1998 96.67 96.67 97.92 96.67 97.51 
1999 96.67 96.67 90.17 94.45 96.24 
2000 93.01 96.67 89.51 91.95 95.82 
2001 76.99 96.67 89.51 90.28 93.39 
2002 76.01 85.51 83.29 74.18 90.83 
2003 74.35 85.51 82.96 71.96 88.17 
2004 72.27 80.60 81.32 70.29 84.95 
2005 68.38 80.60 81.32 69.46 84.33 
2006 65.27 75.68 80.43 65.29 80.96 
2007 64.11 72.71 77.52 40.02 80.29 
2008 63.69 70.02 75.85 36.69 76.35 
2009 63.36 70.02 75.85 36.69 74.17 
2010 63.36 70.02 74.18 35.85 71.68 
2011 63.36 70.02 71.69 35.85 70.64 
2012 63.36 70.02 54.20 35.85 69.04 
2013 62.39 70.02 50.86 28.35 68.08 
2014 61.97 53.08 50.86 21.68 65.93 
2015 61.55 50.30 50.86 21.68 55.59 
2016 48.63 49.19 49.19 21.68 53.38 
2017 47.24 49.19 49.19 21.68 32.99 
2018 36.69 51.68 46.70 21.68 32.57 
2019 36.69 52.52 46.70 21.68 32.57 
 






 Philippines Myanmar Thailand Malaysia Indonesia 
1997 100.00 93.33 73.38 73.34 86.67 
1998 100.00 100.00 73.38 73.34 86.67 
1999 100.00 100.00 73.38 73.34 86.67 
2000 100.00 100.00 73.38 73.34 86.67 
2001 61.68 93.33 73.38 70.01 86.67 
2002 58.35 93.33 66.72 56.68 83.34 
2003 57.16 94.29 66.72 53.82 83.34 
2004 49.78 84.77 63.86 50.97 80.48 
2005 47.80 86.67 64.50 52.24 81.12 
2006 43.35 77.79 64.50 52.24 60.01 
2007 44.69 72.02 62.72 47.35 60.68 
2008 44.69 72.02 54.05 45.35 57.35 
2009 44.69 72.02 54.05 43.13 55.35 
2010 44.69 72.02 54.05 43.13 55.35 
2011 44.69 72.02 52.05 43.13 55.35 
2012 44.69 68.02 52.05 40.93 53.35 
2013 44.69 68.02 50.05 36.71 50.01 
2014 44.69 58.02 50.05 36.71 34.68 
2015 44.69 58.02 50.05 36.71 34.68 
2016 41.35 58.02 30.04 36.71 34.68 
2017 41.35 54.69 30.04 36.71 34.68 
2018 38.02 54.69 30.04 36.71 34.68 






 Philippines Myanmar Thailand Malaysia Indonesia 
1997 37.80 -no data- 37.76 29.96 39.12 
1998 36.80 -no data- 38.00 28.80 42.00 





2000 38.80 -no data- 37.20 30.80 43.20 
2001 38.40 -no data- 37.20 30.00 42.40 
2002 39.60 -no data- 37.20 30.40 42.40 
2003 40.00 -no data- 36.80 29.20 42.40 
2004 39.60 43.20 35.60 30.00 42.00 
2005 40.00 42.80 34.80 29.60 41.20 
2006 40.00 42.40 35.60 30.00 40.40 
2007 40.00 44.40 36.80 29.60 40.80 
2008 40.80 44.80 36.00 29.60 39.60 
2009 40.40 44.40 36.40 32.00 38.80 
2010 40.40 44.40 36.00 32.40 38.80 
2011 39.60 44.00 36.40 32.80 38.00 
2012 36.40 44.00 35.20 30.40 37.20 
2013 35.60 41.60 36.00 30.00 37.20 
2014 34.80 41.60 34.80 29.20 36.40 
2015 36.00 41.20 34.80 30.00 35.60 
2016 36.00 38.80 36.00 30.40 35.20 
2017 36.40 38.00 35.20 31.20 35.20 
2018 35.60 38.40 35.60 31.20 34.80 
2019 36.40 38.40 35.60 28.80 34.00 
 
 
GNI per capita  
 
 Philippines Myanmar Thailand Malaysia Indonesia 
1997 1230 -no data- 2680 4620 1100 
1998 1200 -no data- 2080 3640 660 
1999 1180 -no data- 1980 3380 570 
2000 1150 -no data- 1980 3460 580 
2001 1160 -no data- 1960 3550 720 
2002 1130 170 1990 3790 790 
2003 1170 180 2180 4160 900 





2005 1380 270 2790 5270 1220 
2006 1490 290 3100 5840 1380 
2007 1720 350 3530 6630 1600 
2008 2000 470 3970 7510 1940 
2009 2170 640 4140 7600 2150 
2010 2370 850 4580 8260 2530 
2011 2520 1010 4950 9050 3010 
2012 2860 1130 5520 10180 3580 
2013 3160 1220 5720 10840 3730 
2014 3330 1230 5760 11140 3620 
2015 3380 1260 5710 10680 3430 
2016 3450 1280 5700 10150 3400 
2017 3530 1290 5960 9940 3530 
2018 3710 1370 6600 10590 3850 
2019 3850 1390 7260 11200 4050 
 
 







Tech Gov Att Coo Egmont Corruption GNP 
1997 87.88 96.67 100.00 0.00 30.50 1230.00 
1998 87.88 96.67 100.00 0.00 33.00 1200.00 
1999 87.88 96.67 100.00 0.00 36.00 1180.00 
2000 87.88 93.01 100.00 0.00 28.00 1150.00 
2001 81.83 76.99 61.68 0.00 29.00 1160.00 
2002 81.83 76.01 58.35 0.00 26.00 1130.00 
2003 60.63 74.35 57.16 0.00 25.00 1170.00 
2004 60.63 72.27 49.78 0.00 26.00 1290.00 
2005 60.63 68.38 47.80 100.00 25.00 1380.00 
2006 60.63 65.27 43.35 100.00 25.00 1490.00 





2008 60.63 63.69 44.69 100.00 23.00 2000.00 
2009 60.63 63.36 44.69 100.00 24.00 2170.00 
2010 60.63 63.36 44.69 100.00 24.00 2370.00 
2011 60.63 63.36 44.69 100.00 26.00 2520.00 
2012 60.63 63.36 44.69 100.00 34.00 2860.00 
2013 60.63 62.39 44.69 100.00 36.00 3160.00 
2014 60.63 61.97 44.69 100.00 38.00 3330.00 
2015 60.63 61.55 44.69 100.00 35.00 3380.00 
2016 60.63 48.63 41.35 100.00 35.00 3450.00 
2017 60.63 47.24 41.35 100.00 34.00 3530.00 
2018 48.50 36.69 38.02 100.00 36.00 3710.00 









Tech Gov Att Coo Egmont Corruption GNP 
1997 68.34 96.67 93.33 0.00 -no data- -no data- 
1998 68.34 96.67 100.00 0.00 -no data- -no data- 
1999 68.34 96.67 100.00 0.00 -no data- -no data- 
2000 68.34 96.67 100.00 0.00 -no data- -no data- 
2001 68.34 96.67 93.33 0.00 -no data- -no data- 
2002 58.34 85.51 93.33 0.00 -no data- 170.00 
2003 48.34 85.51 94.29 0.00 -no data- 180.00 
2004 48.34 80.60 84.77 0.00 17.00 220.00 
2005 48.34 80.60 86.67 0.00 18.00 270.00 
2006 48.34 75.68 77.79 0.00 19.00 290.00 
2007 48.34 72.71 72.02 0.00 14.00 350.00 
2008 48.34 70.02 72.02 0.00 13.00 470.00 
2009 48.34 70.02 72.02 0.00 14.00 640.00 
2010 48.34 70.02 72.02 0.00 14.00 850.00 





2012 48.34 70.02 68.02 0.00 15.00 1130.00 
2013 48.34 70.02 68.02 0.00 21.00 1220.00 
2014 48.34 53.08 58.02 0.00 21.00 1230.00 
2015 48.34 50.30 58.02 0.00 22.00 1260.00 
2016 48.34 49.19 58.02 0.00 28.00 1280.00 
2017 48.34 49.19 54.69 0.00 30.00 1290.00 
2018 45.01 51.68 54.69 0.00 29.00 1370.00 










Tech Gov Att Coo Egmont Corruption GNP 
1997 93.94 97.92 73.38 0.00 30.60 2680.00 
1998 93.94 97.92 73.38 0.00 30.00 2080.00 
1999 63.65 90.17 73.38 0.00 32.00 1980.00 
2000 63.65 89.51 73.38 0.00 32.00 1980.00 
2001 63.65 89.51 73.38 0.00 32.00 1960.00 
2002 63.65 83.29 66.72 0.00 32.00 1990.00 
2003 63.65 82.96 66.72 0.00 33.00 2180.00 
2004 63.65 81.32 63.86 0.00 36.00 2530.00 
2005 63.65 81.32 64.50 0.00 38.00 2790.00 
2006 63.65 80.43 64.50 0.00 36.00 3100.00 
2007 63.65 77.52 62.72 0.00 33.00 3530.00 
2008 66.68 75.85 54.05 0.00 35.00 3970.00 
2009 66.68 75.85 54.05 10.00 34.00 4140.00 
2010 66.68 74.18 54.05 10.00 35.00 4580.00 
2011 57.59 71.69 52.05 10.00 34.00 4950.00 
2012 57.59 54.20 52.05 10.00 37.00 5520.00 
2013 48.50 50.86 50.05 10.00 35.00 5720.00 





2015 48.50 50.86 50.05 10.00 38.00 5710.00 
2016 48.50 49.19 30.04 10.00 35.00 5700.00 
2017 48.50 49.19 30.04 10.00 37.00 5960.00 
2018 48.50 46.70 30.04 10.00 36.00 6600.00 









Tech Gov Att Coo Egmont Corruption GNP 
1997 90.91 96.67 73.34 0.00 50.10 4620.00 
1998 90.91 96.67 73.34 0.00 53.00 3640.00 
1999 90.91 94.45 73.34 0.00 51.00 3380.00 
2000 90.91 91.95 73.34 0.00 48.00 3460.00 
2001 62.13 90.28 70.01 0.00 50.00 3550.00 
2002 62.13 74.18 56.68 0.00 49.00 3790.00 
2003 62.13 71.96 53.82 100.00 52.00 4160.00 
2004 62.13 70.29 50.97 100.00 50.00 4740.00 
2005 62.13 69.46 52.24 100.00 51.00 5270.00 
2006 36.37 65.29 52.24 100.00 50.00 5840.00 
2007 36.37 40.02 47.35 100.00 51.00 6630.00 
2008 36.37 36.69 45.35 100.00 51.00 7510.00 
2009 36.37 36.69 43.13 100.00 45.00 7600.00 
2010 33.34 35.85 43.13 100.00 44.00 8260.00 
2011 33.34 35.85 43.13 100.00 43.00 9050.00 
2012 33.34 35.85 40.93 100.00 49.00 10180.00 
2013 33.34 28.35 36.71 100.00 50.00 10840.00 
2014 33.34 21.68 36.71 100.00 52.00 11140.00 
2015 33.34 21.68 36.71 100.00 50.00 10680.00 
2016 33.34 21.68 36.71 100.00 49.00 10150.00 
2017 33.34 21.68 36.71 100.00 47.00 9940.00 














Tech Gov Att Coo Egmont Corruption GNP 
1997 90.91 98.28 86.67 0.00 2.72 1100.00 
1998 90.91 97.51 86.67 0.00 2.00 660.00 
1999 90.91 96.24 86.67 0.00 1.70 570.00 
2000 90.91 95.82 86.67 0.00 1.70 580.00 
2001 75.26 93.39 86.67 0.00 1.90 720.00 
2002 75.26 90.83 83.34 0.00 1.90 790.00 
2003 59.61 88.17 83.34 0.00 1.90 900.00 
2004 59.61 84.95 80.48 100.00 2.00 1080.00 
2005 59.61 84.33 81.12 100.00 2.20 1220.00 
2006 58.10 80.96 60.01 100.00 2.40 1380.00 
2007 54.56 80.29 60.68 100.00 2.30 1600.00 
2008 54.56 76.35 57.35 100.00 2.60 1940.00 
2009 54.56 74.17 55.35 100.00 2.80 2150.00 
2010 50.02 71.68 55.35 100.00 2.80 2530.00 
2011 42.44 70.64 55.35 100.00 3.00 3010.00 
2012 42.44 69.04 53.35 100.00 3.20 3580.00 
2013 42.44 68.08 50.01 100.00 3.20 3730.00 
2014 33.34 65.93 34.68 100.00 3.40 3620.00 
2015 33.34 55.59 34.68 100.00 3.60 3430.00 
2016 33.34 53.38 34.68 100.00 3.70 3400.00 
2017 33.34 32.99 34.68 100.00 3.70 3530.00 
2018 33.34 32.57 34.68 100.00 3.80 3850.00 









 Philippines Myanmar Malaysia Thailand Indonesia 
1997 3.7 0.82 2.45 0.87 4.68 
1998 3.7 0.82 3.2 3.4 5.78 
1999 3.73 0.83 3.43 2.97 6.36 
2000 3.71 0.82 3 2.39 6.08 
2001 3.7 0.82 3.53 2.6 6.08 
2002 3.63 0.83 3.48 1.82 6.6 
2003 3.53 0.83 3.61 1.54 6.66 
2004 3.55 0.82 3.54 1.51 7.3 
2005 3.8 0.79 3.53 1.35 7.95 
2006 4.05 0.75 3.32 1.22 7.55 
2007 3.43 0.72 3.23 1.18 8.06 
2008 3.72 0.71 3.34 1.18 7.21 
2009 3.86 0.78 3.69 0.93 6.11 
2010 3.61 0.79 3.25 0.62 5.61 
2011 3.59 0.79 3.05 0.66 5.15 
2012 3.5 0.79 3.04 0.58 4.47 
2013 3.5 0.8 3.11 0.21 4.34 
2014 3.6 0.78 2.88 0.58 4.05 
2015 3.07 0.77 3.1 0.6 4.51 
2016 2.69 1.14 3.44 0.69 4.3 
2017 2.55 1.56 3.41 0.83 3.88 
2018 2.34 0.87 3.3 0.77 4.4 




 Philippines Myanmar Malaysia Thailand Indonesia 





1998 9.23 51.49 5.27 7.99 58.45 
1999 5.94 18.40 2.74 0.28 20.48 
2000 3.98 -0.11 1.53 1.59 3.69 
2001 5.35 21.10 1.42 1.63 11.50 
2002 2.72 57.07 1.81 0.70 11.90 
2003 2.29 36.59 1.09 1.80 6.76 
2004 4.83 4.53 1.42 2.76 6.06 
2005 6.52 9.37 2.98 4.54 10.45 
2006 5.49 20.00 3.61 4.64 13.11 
2007 2.90 35.02 2.03 2.24 6.41 
2008 8.26 26.80 5.44 5.47 10.23 
2009 4.22 1.47 0.58 -0.85 4.39 
2010 3.79 7.72 1.62 3.25 5.13 
2011 4.72 5.02 3.17 3.81 5.36 
2012 3.03 1.47 1.66 3.01 4.28 
2013 2.58 5.64 2.11 2.18 6.41 
2014 3.60 4.95 3.14 1.90 6.39 
2015 0.67 9.45 2.10 -0.90 6.36 
2016 1.25 6.93 2.09 0.19 3.53 
2017 2.85 4.57 3.87 0.67 3.81 
2018 5.21 6.87 0.88 1.06 3.20 
2019 2.48 8.83 0.66 0.71 3.03 
 
Size of the financial sector  
 
 Philippines Myanmar Malaysia Thailand Indonesia 
1997 56.46 10.32 154.89 166.50 60.82 
1998 43.32 9.70 152.85 153.41 53.21 
1999 38.52 8.10 141.67 127.72 20.48 





2001 36.27 11.00 127.23 93.08 18.16 
2002 33.66 10.34 121.35 96.87 19.34 
2003 31.95 4.10 118.59 94.13 21.19 
2004 31.01 4.74 111.63 95.14 24.72 
2005 27.90 4.66 106.29 93.83 25.54 
2006 27.47 3.88 103.49 88.91 23.87 
2007 27.64 3.42 101.42 86.23 25.16 
2008 27.88 3.12 96.60 87.71 26.30 
2009 27.90 3.47 111.45 90.34 24.89 
2010 28.33 4.77 107.04 90.68 24.36 
2011 30.50 6.75 108.35 101.43 26.88 
2012 31.91 9.31 114.05 106.37 29.89 
2013 34.34 12.84 119.79 111.52 32.37 
2014 37.58 15.56 120.53 113.99 32.93 
2015 39.90 17.75 123.07 115.86 33.09 
2016 42.86 21.21 121.94 113.72 33.13 
2017 45.61 23.64 117.13 112.10 32.42 
2018 47.56 24.96 120.31 112.19 32.74 
2019 47.98 25.74 120.84 111.37 32.48 
 
Federal tax  
 
Year Philippines Myanmar 
 
Malaysia Thailand Indonesia 
1997 16.98 4.42 19.75 16.11 16.01 
1998 14.11 3.52 16.73 13.79 15.03 
1999 13.31 2.75 14.09 12.89 16.32 
2000 12.44 2.97 13.67 12.98  
2001 12.27 2.26 17.79 13.07 11.58 
2002 11.67 2.00 17.45 13.47 11.83 





2004 11.36 3.27 15.20 14.85 12.33 
2005 11.92 3.88 14.83 16.06  
2006 13.13  14.52 15.64  
2007 12.96  14.30 15.14  
2008 13.03  14.66 15.38 13.31 
2009 11.70  14.94 14.19 11.06 
2010 11.64  13.33 14.93 10.54 
2011 11.85  14.79 16.36 11.16 
2012 12.31 4.52 15.61 15.44 11.38 
2013 12.74 5.53 15.31 17.01 11.29 
2014 13.02 5.84 14.84 15.81 10.84 
2015 13.02 5.88 14.06 16.14 10.75 
2016 13.09 6.91 13.55 15.36 10.34 
2017 13.59 5.87 12.95 14.78 9.88 
2018 14.05 2.63 12.03 14.93 10.23 
2019 14.49 5.81 11.95 14.67 9.75 
 
Military spending as a % of GDP 
 
 Philippines Myanmar Malaysia Thailand Indonesia 
1997 1.91 2.31 2.09 2.16 1.50 
1998 1.70 2.01 1.61 1.89 1.02 
1999 1.62 1.73 2.10 1.68 0.81 
2000 1.61 2.00 1.63 1.53 0.68 
2001 1.47 1.56 2.08 1.49 0.57 
2002 1.47 1.13 2.22 1.43 0.70 
2003 1.55 1.67 2.61 1.32 0.91 
2004 1.36 1.66 2.26 1.15 0.95 
2005 1.33 1.35 2.17 1.12 0.75 





2007 1.35  2.05 1.43 0.71 
2008 1.30  1.91 1.64 0.58 
2009 1.26  1.96 1.82 0.57 
2010 1.22  1.51 1.56 0.62 
2011 1.21  1.57 1.59 0.65 
2012 1.16  1.43 1.38 0.71 
2013 1.24  1.52 1.40 0.92 
2014 1.09  1.46 1.41 0.78 
2015 1.14  1.53 1.43 0.88 
2016 1.09  1.41 1.62 0.79 
2017 1.31  1.12 1.58 0.87 
2018 0.86  0.98 1.36 0.73 
2019 0.96  1.03 1.34 0.67 
 
 
Exchange rate (compared to USD)  
 
 Philippines Myanmar Malaysia Thailand Indonesia 
1997 29.47 6.24 2.81 31.36 2909.38 
1998 40.89 6.34 3.92 41.36 10013.62 
1999 39.09 6.29 3.80 37.81 7855.15 
2000 44.19 6.52 3.80 40.11 8421.78 
2001 50.99 6.75 3.80 44.43 10260.85 
2002 51.60 6.64 3.80 42.96 9311.19 
2003 54.20 6.14 3.80 41.48 8577.13 
2004 56.04 5.81 3.80 40.22 8938.85 
2005 55.09 5.82 3.79 40.22 9704.74 
2006 51.31 5.84 3.67 37.88 9159.32 
2007 46.15 5.62 3.44 34.52 9141.00 





2009 47.68 5.58 3.52 34.29 10389.94 
2010 45.11 5.63 3.22 31.69 9090.43 
2011 43.31 5.44 3.06 30.49 8770.43 
2012 42.23 640.65 3.09 31.08 9386.63 
2013 42.45 933.57 3.15 30.73 10461.24 
2014 44.40 984.35 3.27 32.48 11865.21 
2015 45.50 1162.62 3.91 34.25 13389.41 
2016 47.49 1234.87 4.15 35.30 13308.33 
2017 50.40 1360.36 4.30 33.94 13380.83 
2018 52.66 1429.81 4.04 32.31 14236.94 
2019 51.80 1518.26 4.14 31.05 14147.67 
 
Trade misinvoicing  
 
 Value of misinvoicing % of CIF 
1997 $2,686,655,730 6.96 
1998 $2,783,227,592 8.83 
1999 $5,170,349,305 15.88 
2000 $8,297,707,613 22.42 
2001 $4,893,459,728 14.00 
2002 $1,172,785,283 2.85 
2003 $1,833,889,969 4.31 
2004 $4,266,293,618 9.25 
2005 $2,058,080,593 4.16 
2006 $2,745,348,169 5.08 
2007 $6,440,210,126 11.10 
2008 $12,003,344,684 19.87 





2010 $31,668,455,209 54.16 
2011 $37,303,315,789 58.57 
2012 $31,537,279,533 48.26 
2013 $36,144,568,763 55.01 
2014 $41,659,131,481 61.52 
2015 $32,455,533,673 46.26 
2016 $22,783,427,884 26.52 
2017 $17,562,568,034 17.24 
2018 $14,476,983,546 12.58 
2019 $10,469,735,243 8.93 
 
 
 Value of misinvoicing % of CIF 
1997 $175,950,254.00 6.15 
1998 $125,236,735.00 5.31 
1999 $190,057,030.00 7.52 
2000 $367,349,169.00 11.51 
2001 $81,962,854.00 3.39 
2002 $225,200,897.00 7.64 
2003 $120,875,799.00 4.26 
2004 $425,625,558.00 14.58 
2005 $335,616,049.00 11.54 
2006 $415,984,427.00 13.31 
2007 $899,198,863.00 22.02 
2008 $1,290,701,230.00 25.40 
2009 $2,242,057,519.00 53.18 





2011 $4,096,462,221.00 47.79 
2012 $7,935,888,952.00 101.10 
2013 $7,073,501,385.00 58.90 
2014 $6,405,125,123.00 39.46 
2015 $6,078,697,021.00 35.94 
2016 $6,507,052,582.00 41.46 
2017 $4,131,291,560.00 21.46 
2018 $6,361,053,381.00 32.88 
2019 $8,338,338,309.00 44.88 
 
 
 Value of misinvoicing % of CIF 
1997 $3,788,126,218.00 6.06 
1998 $13,720,432,340.00 32.38 
1999 $11,215,939,112.00 22.29 
2000 $13,019,953,485.00 21.03 
2001 $9,475,963,303.00 15.05 
2002 $10,149,968,698.00 15.47 
2003 $12,007,473,486.00 15.61 
2004 $13,577,382,912.00 14.22 
2005 $4,794,107,098.00 4.01 
2006 $15,243,267,024.00 11.72 
2007 $23,641,246,156.00 16.23 
2008 $17,105,766,088.00 9.46 
2009 $31,302,513,106.00 23.05 
2010 $29,891,577,739.00 16.19 





2012 $7,461,104,194.00 2.99 
2013 $11,517,814,068.00 4.55 
2014 $71,776,696,380.00 31.18 
2015 $33,185,941,323.00 16.16 
2016 $46,912,194,967.00 23.79 
2017 $41,028,830,389.00 18.24 
2018 $29,666,761,893.00 11.74 
2019 $54,939,646,092.00 24.96 
 
 
 Value of misinvoicing % of CIF 
1997 $12,961,234,905.00 16.53 
1998 $25,587,786,770.00 44.30 
1999 $27,596,623,486.00 42.50 
2000 $31,040,017,656.00 37.57 
2001 $35,332,391,155.00 47.85 
2002 $29,499,977,275.00 34.25 
2003 $49,751,018,372.00 59.50 
2004 $53,004,000,000.00 49.97 
2005 $61,022,000,000.00 52.93 
2006 $68,490,000,000.00 52.23 
2007 $76,368,000,000.00 51.83 
2008 $93,664,000,000.00 60.17 
2009 $75,358,000,000.00 60.98 
2010 $99,358,000,000.00 60.32 
2011 $116,179,000,000.00 61.93 





2013 $96,488,000,000.00 46.84 
2014 $95,869,000,000.00 45.88 
2015 $99,104,000,000.00 56.25 
2016 $94,110,000,000.00 55.88 
2017 $99,555,000,000.00 51.12 
2018 $115,091,000,000.00 52.93 
2019 $125,665,000,000.00 61.30 
 
 
 Value of misinvoicing % of CIF 
1997 $12,394,748,731.00 29.74 
1998 $23,654,233,383.00 86.53 
1999 $30,658,719,848.00 127.73 
2000 $32,252,089,231.00 95.39 
2001 $31,971,700,791.00 102.38 
2002 $33,460,435,765.00 106.17 
2003 $49,010,515,747.00 149.19 
2004 $49,017,437,882.00 104.93 
2005 $49,613,000,000.00 85.55 
2006 $64,940,000,000.00 105.64 
2007 $69,288,000,000.00 93.04 
2008 $41,827,000,000.00 32.36 
2009 $41,816,000,000.00 43.18 
2010 $44,491,000,000.00 32.76 
2011 $49,380,000,000.00 27.80 
2012 $28,596,000,000.00 14.91 





2014 $24,777,000,000.00 13.89 
2015 $35,076,000,000.00 24.56 
2016 $34,265,000,000.00 25.24 
2017 $40,081,000,000.00 25.54 
2018 $142,467,000,000.00 75.48 








($USD) Philippines Myanmar Malaysia Thailand Indonesia 
1997 $126.46 980 25 2962 2101 3816 
1998 $122.51 880 25 1903 1814 2699 
1999 $114.04 530 25 2770 1532 2891 
2000 $116.60 426 25 3650 2100 2848 
2001 $109.68 500 25 4100 2127 2781 
2002 $114.06 550 25 4722 2538 2462 
2003 $121.49 500 25 3960 3551 2042 
2004 $162.41 400 25 5698 4533 3682 
2005 $171.14 470 25 5296 5161 3675 
2006 $186.53 558 25 5834 5210 3759 
2007 $201.06 718 25 6895 5565 4160 
2008 $246.42 711 25 6423 5211 3915 
2009 $184.00 824 25 5354 3646 3501 
2010 $223.53 1050 25 5694 4145 3664 
2011 $253.23 1200 25 5941 4238 3621 
2012 $240.71 1260 25 5612 3328 2254 





2014 $232.11 1196 35 4316 4095 4428 
2015 $195.58 968 35 3784 3718 4854 
2016 $186.98 1075 35 2764 3825 4746 
2017 $211.99 1378 250 3215 6762 5195 
2018 $237.77 1475 300 4108 6403 6183 






($USD) Philippines Myanmar Malaysia Thailand Indonesia 
1997 $33.22 569 12 153 6784 31347 
1998 $28.04 612 12 221 5847 34997 
1999 $25.08 529 89 174 5297 42151 
2000 $26.41 716 320 242 5135 45455 
2001 $33.09 650 366 344 5689 53526 
2002 $25.67 803 288 223 5685 58297 
2003 $28.16 1056 509 110 5465 67029 
2004 $53.82 1310 254 245 5818 82614 
2005 $46.91 1520 318 497 6055 98231 
2006 $49.89 1243 400 568 5510 135070 
2007 $64.19 1791 427 678 5289 143590 
2008 $123.85 1905 378 791 5215 142503 
2009 $68.26 2474 357 1348 5158 166802 
2010 $95.29 3510 409 1511 5320 186314 
2011 $118.87 3632 411 1838 6185 245153 
2012 $94.64 3879 500 1860 5240 256680 
2013 $82.40 3743 342 1824 5102 268273 
2014 $71.23 4012 410 1694 4622 264581 
2015 $57.82 3894 445 1613 3858 243722 





2017 $86.83 6298 287 1884 4105 262705 
2018 $102.33 6204 508 1672 3750 287537 
2019 $74.91 5917 275 2180 3554 323171 
 




($USD) Philippines Myanmar Malaysia Thailand Indonesia 
1997 $2.61 210 66445 1626107 581984 2911315 
1998 $2.25 357 108430 1643796 634917 2846614 
1999 $2.20 274 181499 1704353 691059 3044078 
2000 $4.08 407 240807 1979891 727539 2845363 
2001 $4.01 5365 244015 1926816 706874 2745060 
2002 $3.20 67402 252967 1987351 748144 3023609 
2003 $4.70 102727 306893 2079981 788481 3166273 
2004 $5.09 94872 400544 2372896 815219 3027787 
2005 $7.62 125654 479082 2575834 86021 3050791 
2006 $7.60 117680 494789 2539270 88533 3015884 
2007 $7.77 141089 530917 2526100 94540 2903165 
2008 $11.13 148512 486936 2655260 1071448 2993197 
2009 $6.33 149499 453164 2417059 998176 3121762 
2010 $6.34 141915 473191 2372939 1150367 3480020 
2011 $7.26 153223 467694 2450767 1023706 3307161 
2012 $7.11 146887 471228 2393966 1219151 3131982 
2013 $7.75 135296 483794 2706600 1320549 3104946 
2014 $7.21 142290 594533 2737051 1348418 3055983 
2015 $4.72 133765 687208 2690871 1199937 3046488 
2016 $3.53 153257 744589 2662298 1176806 3003198 
2017 $4.34 151181 741899 2609388 1098964 2908199 
2018 $5.42 16883 724321 2751881 1063777 2912067 










($USD) Philippines Myanmar Malaysia Thailand Indonesia 
1997 $18.79 2710 1367 51786 42188 124563 
1998 $12.64 2468 1341 52372 39611 123559 
1999 $17.68 2406 1444 50405 42299 121815 
2000 $27.53 2611 1547 51610 43562 119277 
2001 $23.83 2573 1534 55188 44776 116052 
2002 $24.54 2808 1713 55995 49082 109409 
2003 $28.16 2674 1729 58496 53735 105679 
2004 $36.50 1957 1795 59649 57899 102382 
2005 $52.37 2213 1862 57019 58459 99374 
2006 $63.70 2151 1859 57026 61488 95855 
2007 $70.73 2262 1837 58814 61782 92594 
2008 $96.13 2370 1749 59963 63609 95745 
2009 $61.79 1699 1685 56932 66353 95407 
2010 $78.91 2909 1748 53872 68640 92432 
2011 $106.99 2802 1603 52819 67969 91579 
2012 $108.63 2440 1498 55438 72557 87897 
2013 $106.12 2327 1513 52803 76202 84440 
2014 $97.28 2652 1457 52550 73102 86178 
2015 $51.43 3234 1153 56118 78364 84743 
2016 $42.69 2152 1015 58222 78223 88171 
2017 $53.44 3133 873 59999 79023 87405 
2018 $69.52 2054 719 56855 79634 88016 
2019 $62.87 711 476 30424 18584 37254 
 
PCA  














Formal sources: contribution to first dimension 
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